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Abstract 
The rapid increase in global liquidity and the large-scale net capital flows to emerging 
countries have raised serious concerns about adverse effects on the recipient countries; 
these include the danger of overheating, exchange rate appreciation pressures, inflationary 
pressure on consumer and asset prices, and risks to financial stability. The historical 
experience of many emerging countries highlights the risk of a rapid reversal of capital 
flows, followed by a possible financial and currency crisis. There have also been concerns 
about the inflationary consequences of excessive global liquidity for commodity prices, 
including those of agricultural commodities. Against this backdrop, this volume comprises 
contributions by internationally renowned experts from academia and international 
organisations who discuss the spillover effects of expansionary monetary policies in 
advanced countries on emerging economies, and the risks that excessive global liquidity 
and abundant capital flows to emerging economies entail for macroeconomic and financial 
stability in these countries. They also discuss policy options for reining in these risks, 
ranging from capital account management and prudential policies in source and recipient 
countries to an enhanced monitoring of global capital flows. 
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Introduction 
Ulrich Volz 
The world economy has been in a state of fragility since the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis in September 2008. While most emerging countries navigated the crisis 
with relative success and staged strong recoveries in 2009, many advanced countries are 
still struggling with recession or tremors in their banking systems. Since 2010, the 
European sovereign debt crisis has not only caused jitters in the global financial markets 
but has also sparked worries about contagious effects around the world, increasing the 
volatility of international capital flows. 
The central banks of all major advanced economies responded to the global financial crisis 
and the ensuing recession with unprecedented monetary expansion by lowering interest 
rates to historically low levels and pursuing unconventional monetary policies, such as 
large asset-buying programmes. As shown in Figure 1, both the Federal Reserve System 
and the Eurosystem have seen remarkable expansions of their balance sheets since 
September 2008. The extremely accommodative monetary policies in the major advanced 
countries have caused a surge in global liquidity. Moreover, the resulting large interest 
rate differentials have incited carry trades and capital flows into emerging economies with 
higher risk-adjusted rates of return. Capital flows to emerging countries have been further 
reinforced by rather bleak growth prospects in advanced countries. The monetary 
expansion in Europe and the United States (US) caused Brazil’s president Dilma Rousseff 
in March 2012 to voice her concerns about the resulting “monetary tsunami” that was 
making its way to emerging economies. 
Figure 2 shows that prior to the global financial crisis net private capital flows to emerging 
countries rose from USD 149 billion in 2002 to an all-time high of USD 1,244 billion in 
2007. This upward trend in net private capital flows to emerging countries was reversed in 
2008: net inflows were halved to USD 619 billion as financial institutions in advanced 
countries scrambled to liquidate assets, even profitable ones in emerging markets, 
wherever they could in the face of the liquidity crunch on the US and European markets. 
The result was a global credit crunch in the last quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 
that was felt in emerging countries as well. Even though the US was the epicentre of the 
crisis, the global flight to safety into US Treasury bills, along with a reversal of carry 
trades, led to large capital inflows into the US during the crisis and caused a strong 
appreciation of the US dollar (McCauley / McGuire 2009). By 2010, however, net flows 
to emerging countries had again reached an impressive USD 1,040 billion. In 2011, net 
flows to emerging markets ebbed to an estimated USD 910 billion as the European 
sovereign debt and banking crisis increased funding difficulties among European banks. 
The need for liquid assets and the introduction of new European Union capital 
requirements caused European banks to cut back their international exposure and sell 
assets in emerging markets at the end of 2011.1 The Institute of International Finance 
projects net private capital inflows of USD 746 billion to emerging economies in 2012 and 
                                                
1 The European Banking Authority requires major European banks to increase their core capital to 9% 
of risk-weighted assets by mid-2012. 
Financial stability in emerging markets: dealing with global liquidity Ulrich Volz (ed.) 
2 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Figure 1: Total assets of the Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve System (in USD millions) 
  
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the ECB and the Federal Reserve. 
 
Figure 2: Net private capital inflows to emerging markets (in USD millions) 
 
Note: The 2011 figure is estimated (e); figures for 2012 and 2013 are forecasts (f). Net private capital inflows to 
emerging markets (EM) represent flows of capital (both equity and debt) from foreign private sector investors 
and lenders. “Net” means that foreign investors’ withdrawals of capital are subtracted. Outward investments 
by EM residents (“capital outflows”) are not taken into account here. Net inflows to EM from official sector 
sources are also excluded. The sample includes a geographically diverse group of the 30 largest EM countries, 
i.e. those which account for the vast majority of global capital flows to EM. 
Source:   Compiled by the author based on data from IIF (2011, 2012). 
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USD 893 billion in 2013. Compared with historical standards, these are enormous sums 
that emerging economies will have to absorb. 
The rapid increase in global liquidity and the large-scale net capital flows to emerging 
countries have raised serious concerns, not least in the recipient countries, about adverse 
effects; these include the danger of overheating, exchange rate appreciation pressures, 
inflationary pressure on consumer and asset prices, and risks to financial stability. The 
historical experience of many emerging countries, not least during the global financial crisis, 
highlights the risk of a rapid reversal of capital flows, followed by a possible financial and 
currency crisis. There have also been concerns about the inflationary consequences of 
excessive global liquidity for commodity prices, including those of agricultural commodities. 
Against this backdrop, the contributions in this volume discuss the spillover effects of 
expansionary monetary policies in advanced countries on emerging economies, and the risks 
that excessive global liquidity and abundant capital flows to emerging economies entail for 
macroeconomic and financial stability in these countries. Several chapters also discuss policy 
options for reining in these risks, ranging from capital account management and prudential 
policies in source and recipient countries to an enhanced monitoring of global capital flows. 
Menzie Chinn evaluates the prospects for rebalancing the global economy, the 
implications of the current two-speed global recovery, and policy options in both 
advanced and emerging economies. In the advanced countries, Chinn urges a looser 
monetary policy to help deleveraging. The macroeconomic difficulties confronting the 
advanced economies will ensure continued capital flows to the emerging markets. To deal 
with these, Chinn believes that emerging market policymakers should first resort to 
macroeconomic measures, including countercyclical fiscal policy and an abstention from 
heavy foreign exchange intervention against exchange rate appreciation; this would also 
facilitate macroeconomic rebalancing. 
Feng Zhu presents empirical evidence concerning the cross-border effects of the Federal 
Reserve’s quantitative easing policy. He shows that the Fed’s asset purchase programmes 
had a broad, immediate, and sizeable impact on global financial markets. In the early 
stage, with the global economy slipping into a major slowdown, these balance sheet 
policies may have contributed to global financial stability and aided the recovery of 
emerging economies by strengthening trade credit and supporting demand. But as many 
emerging economies have returned to solid growth, Zhu highlights that such measures 
may also have increased the risk of overheating, high inflation, and volatile capital flows. 
In particular, fears of disruptive capital inflows and currency appreciation pressures may 
dissuade emerging market central banks from raising policy rates. Zhu cautions that 
further extraordinary monetary stimulus packages in advanced countries may create 
difficult challenges for emerging market central banks. 
Marcel Förster, Markus Jorra and Peter Tillmann investigate the importance of common 
components among international capital flows with different destinations. They apply a 
dynamic factor model in order to gauge the extent to which international capital flows are 
correlated on a global level, and they identify global and regional factors in flows from a 
large set of industrial and emerging economies. Their results suggest that the global factor 
is common to capital flow cycles on the whole, but that a large degree of heterogeneity 
among countries can be attributed to either regional or country-specific determinants. In 
other words, their findings suggest that capital flows to emerging economies are not only 
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(or primarily) driven by global “push” factors, but that country- and region-specific “pull” 
factors also play an important role. Hence they stress the importance of domestic policies 
in emerging countries; these policies, they believe, can have a considerable impact on 
capital flows and can also limit such adverse consequences of capital inflows as asset 
price booms and real appreciation of the domestic currency. 
Ulrich Volz discusses the relation between global liquidity and commodity prices. 
Cointegration analysis indicates a positive long-term relation between global liquidity and 
the development of commodity prices over the last three decades, a relationship that was 
driven by global liquidity. That is, food and commodity price inflation were apparently 
driven by monetary expansion in the world’s major economies. Volz highlights the 
dilemma that arises when the central banks of all major advanced economies 
simultaneously engage in expansionary monetary policies as a means of stabilising their 
respective economies and financial sectors: the resulting global liquidity shock feeds 
commodity and food price inflation. While he regards expansionary monetary policies as 
indispensable in times of severe economic and financial crisis, Volz urges policymakers to 
think of the negative side-effects and to consider stricter regulation of commodity markets, 
especially agricultural commodity markets, in order to avoid driving up prices through a 
further flow of liquidity into these markets. 
Ralph de Haas scrutinises the role of foreign banks in emerging markets and the impact 
of these banks on financial stability. Based on his analysis of the Great Recession, he 
draws two policy lessons: First, the crisis underlined the importance of funding 
structures for banking stability. In particular, it became clear that excessive wholesale 
funding can expose banks to periods of illiquidity in wholesale markets. To reduce their 
vulnerabilities, foreign and domestic banks should therefore focus more on local 
funding. This requires the development of a local-currency deposit base and local-
currency bond markets, each of which would reduce the need for banks to borrow and 
lend in foreign exchange. Second, the recent crisis underscored the risk that 
multinational banks may pass on shocks from home to their host countries and the 
magnitude of these effects if foreign bank affiliates are of local systemic importance. De 
Haas therefore demands improvements in the supervisory framework for multinational 
banking groups in order to ensure better coordination, cooperation, and information 
exchange among supervisors, thus preventing a recurrence of the shock spillovers seen 
during the recent crisis. 
Anton Korinek makes the welfare-theoretic case for regulating capital flows based on the 
notion that such flows impose externalities on the recipient countries. Just as 
environmental pollution produces externalities that reduce societal well-being if 
unregulated, capital inflows to emerging markets produce externalities that make such 
economies more prone to financial instability and crises. As Korinek explains, different 
forms of capital inflows result in different probabilities of future capital outflows and 
different payoff characteristics in the event of a crisis; this in turn leads to different 
externalities. Optimised macroprudential policy should aim precisely at offsetting these 
externalities. He illustrates this with a sample evaluation of the magnitude of 
externalities created by various types of capital inflows to Indonesia. He also points out 
that policy measures for regulating capital inflows should be regularly adjusted to meet 
changes in the financial vulnerability of the respective economy. Since the externalities 
of foreign capital rise during booms, when leverage increases and financial imbalances 
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build up, and new capital inflows create smaller externalities after a crisis has occurred 
and economies have de-leveraged, optimal capital flow regulation should therefore be 
strongly procyclical. 
Y. V. Reddy, who served as Governor of the Reserve Bank of India between 2003 and 2008, 
reviews the Indian experience with capital account management over the past two decades. 
He highlights the importance of integrating management of the capital account with other 
policies – especially fiscal management, regulation of the financial sector, and monetary 
policy – and points out that capital account management should be treated as an essential 
component of countercyclical policies at all times, even when recourse to it is taken as a 
purely temporary measure. In Reddy’s view, capital account management should involve 
both pricing and administrative measures and aim at managing inflows as well as outflows. 
Since the nature of capital flows and the complexity of operations of financial intermediaries 
keep changing, there should be sufficient flexibility for modifying the various measures and 
altering their relative priorities. Reddy emphasises that the critical part of capital account 
management relates to the financial sector and that therefore the most important instrument 
of capital account management should be regulation of the financial sector. 
Stephany Griffith Jones and Kevin Gallagher put forward a counter-cyclical approach for 
avoiding capital flight from advanced to developing and emerging countries. In particular, 
they propose that macroprudential regulatory measures in recipient countries be coupled 
with actions by advanced countries to discourage capital outflows and risk-taking on the 
part of their economies while encouraging productive use of capital within their own 
economies. The prime aim of regulating cross-border capital flows in both recipient and 
source countries is to reduce systemic build-ups of risk in both, thus reducing the risk of 
future crises. The US above all should establish prudent capital regulations or levy taxes 
on the outflow of speculative capital. Measures to discourage short-term outflows would 
encourage the liquidity created by the Fed to stay in the US and be used for promoting 
productive investment. Griffith-Jones and Gallagher hence emphasise that managing 
excessive capital outflows from developed countries, especially from the US, would 
constitute a clear win-win situation by benefiting both the US economy and developing 
economies which are being harmed by excessive short-term inflows. 
Jo Marie Griesgraber scrutinises the role of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and its 
recommendations regarding emerging markets and developing economies. While she 
praises the merits of many of the FSB’s recommendations regarding the regulation and 
surveillance of banks and non-bank financial institutions, the management of exchange 
rates, and an increased reliance on domestic currency loans, she criticises the FSB’s 
failure to address the basic vulnerability of emerging and developing economies to the 
volatile global financial system. She compares the FSB’s recommendations to “tinker toys 
holding back a tsunami, unable to withstand the storms when foreign markets for exports 
dry up, domestic capital flees, and commodity prices sky-rocket or collapse”. Griesgraber 
points out that emerging markets and developing economies have a strong stake in the 
stability of the global financial system but only scant opportunity to participate in the 
design of that system’s management and re-regulation. Especially the poorest developing 
countries are more often than not excluded from decision-making processes that will 
shape the future of their financial markets. She calls for the FSB, as well as the Standard 
Setting Bodies, to become more inclusive, transparent, and accountable. 
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Bernd Braasch highlights the benefits of extended global monitoring of international 
capital flows. Global monitoring should focus on all aspects that contribute to a better 
assessment of the stability of the financial system as a whole. This requires a better 
understanding of how the main global players and drivers of international capital flows 
behave and how that behaviour changes the structures of financial markets. He calls for a 
more thorough analysis of the role and behaviour of institutional investors. In his view, 
this should become a major component of the monitoring of global capital flows. Braasch 
argues that a better understanding of international investors and their portfolio strategies 
and rebalancing activities will enable financial authorities to better identify the sources of 
capital flow volatility, contagion, and spillovers as well as the areas of vulnerability in 
macroeconomically sound countries. This would help policymakers to design better 
responses to external shocks and changes in international crisis transmission channels. It 
would also enhance the effectiveness of early warning systems and help improve 
regulatory frameworks. 
Renato Baumann describes the effects of volatile international capital flows on the 
Brazilian economy. Besides contributing to an inflation of asset prices, with hints of an 
asset bubble, the large capital inflows to Brazil also contributed to an overvaluation of the 
exchange rate. This in turn had a clear effect on the export sector, with export performance 
becoming increasingly dependent on agribusiness while the share of manufactures 
declined. Even though the European crisis caused foreign portfolio investment in Brazil to 
fall by about 40% in 2011, Baumann sees the Brazilian economy in a comfortable and 
stable macroeconomic position with relatively low levels of net public debt, a relatively 
small current account deficit, and foreign exchange reserves exceeding total external debt. 
Last but not least, Akkharaphol Chabchitrchaidol discusses the role of regional 
macroeconomic surveillance and monitoring in coping with the current macroeconomic 
challenges of the East Asian region. Since the Asian financial crisis, the ASEAN+3 
countries have made considerable progress in terms of regional financial cooperation.2 The 
Chiang Mai Initiative, which was launched in 2000 as a network of bilateral central bank 
swaps, was expanded and transformed into a multilateral arrangement among all 
ASEAN+3 member countries (as well as Hong Kong, SAR) in 2010. This new 
arrangement, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), was complemented in 
April 2011 by the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). AMRO’s role is 
to function as a surveillance mechanism that keeps track of the economic and financial 
soundness of members, to make policy recommendations, and to continue monitoring 
once CMIM funds are disbursed. In view of increasing uncertainty and volatility in the 
East Asian region in 2012, Chabchitrchaidol highlights the growing importance of timely 
and effective region-wide surveillance as a means of assessing effects and remedies in 
individual economies. Given policy risks both within and beyond the control of individual 
countries, or potential system-wide shocks such as currency wars, beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies, or unforeseen tail events, cooperation will be crucial as we go forward to avoid 
lose-lose outcomes which may otherwise prevail. 
                                                
2 ASEAN+3 consists of the ten member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam) plus China, Japan, and South Korea. 
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I believe the contributions in this publication provide valuable insights into the current 
challenges emanating from global liquidity for macroeconomic and financial stability in 
the world economy, and emerging countries in particular. They provide different 
perspectives and offer original policy recommendations for dealing with the challenges 
posed by excessive global liquidity and volatile international capital flows. I hope they 
will contribute to a better understanding of the current challenges and formulating 
appropriate policy responses. 
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Global rebalancing with financial stability: possible, feasible, or unlikely? 
Menzie D. Chinn 
In this chapter I will address three key questions facing policymakers: First, what are the 
prospects for global rebalancing? Second, how is the two-speed global recovery evolving? 
And third, what can policy accomplish? 
Imbalances: past, present and future 
The prospects for rebalancing are assessed here from the following perspective: the global 
economy was unbalanced before the financial crisis of 2008, with current account 
surpluses in China and the oil exporting countries matched by deficits primarily in the 
United States (US). While imbalances shrank during the period 2007–09, during the 
ensuing Great Recession, we can now see surpluses and deficits again expanding. 
The source of these imbalances has been the topic of an extensive and heated debate that is 
far too complicated to recount here. I would argue that while intertemporal consumption 
smoothing and the dearth of profitable investment projects in East Asia are partly to blame, I 
think that the existence of distortions in domestic financial markets in the United States 
attracted excess savings from the rest of the world.3 The abdication of regulation on the part 
of the Bush Administration, aided and abetted by the anti-regulatory ethos of the Greenspan 
Fed, ensured that the capital inflows that came with the current account deficit would 
manifest themselves in the form of a massive boom. The resulting bust in consumption led 
to a short-term improvement in the current account as imports fell faster than exports. 
With the resumption of growth, there were hopes that global rebalancing would occur, that 
is, that demand in China and East Asia would reorient itself away from exports and 
towards domestic consumption while US aggregate demand would shift towards tradable 
goods. It was never clear that the first part of the equation would occur, and it’s certainly 
clear that the second part is not occurring with sufficient rapidity to make an impact over 
the next couple of years. 
At this juncture, I think it is useful to recount what our models can tell us. In work with 
Barry Eichengreen and Hiro Ito, we have highlighted the fact that given projected growth 
rates, and the historical norms that have governed the behaviour of current account 
balances over the medium term, a persistence of current account balances can be predicted 
(cf. Chinn / Eichengreen / Ito 2011). On the other hand, it is also true that our models have 
done a poor job of predicting the level of current account balances for key countries like 
the US and China, especially during the 2006–08 period. That is, while budget balances 
explain some of the deterioration in the US current account, and the lack of both financial 
and institutional development explain some of the surpluses of China, movements of these 
factors do not enable us to track external developments in these economies. 
In our forensic analysis, we found that the extent of misprediction during the 2006–08 
period was well explained by housing price appreciation and private bond market growth 
during the preceding 5-year period. In addition, increasing leverage in the household 
                                                
3 See Chinn and Frieden (2011) for this position. 
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sector was clearly associated in a subset of countries with a deterioration in current 
account imbalances. The unfolding of those trends – particularly in the United States, but 
also in the United Kingdom – may very well result in greater current account convergence 
than we predict with our statistical model. 
For China, since our model is unable to capture the behaviour of Chinese surpluses during 
the 2000s, I’m particularly loathe to make predictions based solely on our statistical 
model. Suffice it to say that to date we have not seen evidence that the rapid internal 
rebalancing of China’s spending patterns is having an effect on substantial shrinkage in 
Chinese current account balances. 
The two-speed recovery, accentuated 
The foregoing analysis was based on medium term-trends and a statistical analysis of 
current account balances over the medium term. However, to reach the medium term, one 
must first make it through the short term, and this is where the prospects look particularly 
unfavourable. 
The two-speed recovery – fast growth in the emerging markets coupled with a halting 
recovery in the advanced countries – has become almost a cliché. That being said, recent 
events, including the rapidly escalating level of uncertainty, coupled with an observable 
slowdown in GDP growth in advanced countries (and Europe in particular) have served to 
accentuate this situation. To the extent that US growth slows or goes negative, that would 
certainly effect a short-term decrease in the US current account deficit. However, a 
downturn would definitely complicate rebalancing in the advanced countries, including 
structural adjustments of labour and pension policies, as well as fiscal consolidation in the 
United States. 
Would the emerging market economies escape from a shock to advanced economies? 
There is a widely held view that the developing world has “decoupled” from the advanced 
economies. I think it is important to distinguish between secular and cyclical decoupling. 
While trend growth in the emerging markets seem to have split away from trends in 
advanced economies, it is not clear that the same is true for the business cycle. In 
particular, considering the extent to which trade flows collapsed during the 2008–09 
global recession, I think it would be foolhardy to assert that emerging market growth 
would be largely unaffected. 
What can policy do? 
There are several policy sets that we can consider. While it is always good to consider the 
scope of policy coordination, I will organise my discussion with the assumption that the 
policies are undertaken largely in an independent fashion. 
For the sake of argument, I will concede to the political constraints that largely take 
further expansionary fiscal policy off the table in the advanced economies. However, I do 
retain hope that the current levels of fiscal stimulus will be somewhat maintained. 
In the advanced countries, a looser monetary policy is urgently needed. Attempts to reduce 
the debt burden in the U.S. – to deleverage – have not had much impact. Although private 
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sector debt seems to be declining as a share of income, much of the decline is the result of 
defaults rather than an actual paying down of private debt. We are in fact less than 
halfway through the deleveraging process, which typically takes six to seven years. Only 
if nominal GDP grows more rapidly than nominal debt will the debt burden shrink, and we 
have not yet started that process. Additional measures are urgently needed if we are not to 
suffer through stagnant growth for years – if not relapse into recession. 
Ken Rogoff, the well-known proponent of conservative central banking, has recently 
suggested “trying to achieve some modest deleveraging through moderate inflation of, 
say, 4 to 6 per cent for several years” (Rogoff 2011). 
How might a modest increase in inflation in this period of economic slack and a modest 
depreciation, be accomplished? Although the Fed has adopted an explicit inflation target, I 
believe that, given the exigent conditions facing the US economy, the Fed should adopt a 
flexible inflation target, one that conditions the target inflation rate on the rate of 
unemployment. Jeffry Frieden and I have laid out such an argument (Chinn / Frieden 
2012), following the proposal by the Chicago Fed’s Charles Evans (2011) to keep the Fed 
funds rate near zero, and augmenting this with other quantitative measures, so long as 
unemployment remains above 7% or inflation stays below 3%. Clearly, the Fed is close to 
hitting its inflation target, but it is certainly nowhere close to reaching anything close to its 
output target. Conditioning the inflation target on the unemployment rate means that 
inflationary expectations will remain anchored. 
In Europe, the problem is definitely more complicated, given the fragmented nature of the 
policy authorities, fiscal and monetary. However, it is clear that here too, the current 
approach of country-by-country rescheduling of debt is not in and of itself sufficient to 
address the problems of the debtor countries. A clear commitment, such as that proposed 
by Frieden and myself, to faster euro-area inflation would make a solution easier to the 
extent that real wage adjustment would be facilitated. Of course, this measure should 
enhance, not replace, aggressive measures to reschedule sovereign debt in the crisis 
countries and recapitalise European banks. 
The macroeconomic difficulties confronting the advanced economies ensure continued 
capital flows to the emerging markets. There, policymakers have responded with a 
mixture of conventional macro policies, less conventional capital controls, and prudential 
regulations. 
The use of capital controls and prudential regulations in managing recent capital flows to 
the emerging markets merits some discussion. I think that the use of these measures 
should not be rejected out of hand. However, I think that the efficacy of such measures has 
yet to be demonstrated fully, although there is some evidence that controls on inflows may 
be useful.4 
Until such time as we have a more solid grasp of the efficacy of such measures, it seems 
that the first resort should be to the macroeconomic measures we know will work. These 
include countercyclical fiscal policy and abstention from heavy foreign exchange 
                                                
4 See Ostry et al. (2011); Habermeier / Kokenyne / Baba (2011). 
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intervention against exchange rate appreciation.5 Prudential regulation on the other hand is 
a good idea on other grounds, including enhancing domestic financial stability. 
This policy prescription, I think, is relevant for some emerging market economies, 
particularly in East Asia, where more rapid currency appreciation would help prevent 
overheating while re-allocating much-needed aggregate demand to the advanced 
economies. Here, China’s policy choices are of key importance. While more rapid 
appreciation of the Chinese currency would not be in and of itself sufficient to achieve 
global rebalancing, it would be the fastest- working measure and would facilitate 
adjustment toward a more domestically-oriented growth paradigm. The remaining East 
Asian currencies would also be likely to follow China’s lead, thereby facilitating 
adjustment for the region as a whole. 
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US quantitative easing: spillover effects on emerging economies∗ 
Feng Zhu 
The 2007–2009 global financial crisis and the ensuing recession have significantly 
changed the environment in which central banks perceive and implement monetary policy. 
As policy rates were lowered rapidly to close to zero, policymakers lost their traditional 
lever for influencing longer-term rates by changing interest rates at the very short end. 
Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) suggest three policy options in this situation: first, shape 
public expectations about the future path of the policy rate; second, increase the size of the 
central bank balance sheet beyond the level needed to keep the policy rate at zero; and 
third, change the composition of the balance sheet in order to affect the relative supply of 
securities held by the public. 
Several central banks in the major advanced economies have implemented such 
policies, known as quantitative easing. Asset purchase programmes focusing on 
longer-dated government bonds have been established with the aim of lowering 
interest rates, reviving credit flows, and stimulating economic activity. Consequently, 
the balance sheets of the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the European 
Central Bank have all recorded a sharp expansion in the second half of 2008 
(Figure 1). In addition, the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England have become dominated by holdings of government bonds with maturities of 
five years and above. 
Figure 1: Central bank balance sheet size and maturity1 
Federal Reserve Bank of England Eurosystem    
Notes: (1) In billions of units of national currency. For the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, 
breakdown by remaining maturity; for the Eurosystem, breakdown of outstanding repo operations by original 
maturity. (2): Includes agency debt securities, MBS and US Treasuries held outright; face value. (3): Holdings 
of the Asset Purchase Facility; proceeds. APF transactions are undertaken by the Bank of England Asset 
Purchase Facility Fund Limited. The accounts of the Fund are not consolidated with those of the Bank. The 
Fund is financed by loans from the Bank, which appear on the Bank’s balance sheet as an asset. (4): Includes 
holdings of sterling commercial paper, secured commercial paper and corporate bonds financed by the issue of 
treasury bills and the Debt Management Office’s cash management and by the creation of central bank 
reserves. (5): Securities held under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from Datastream and national data. 
                                                
∗ The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Bank for International Settlements. This paper is based on Chen et al. (2011). 
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Recent US asset purchase programmes 
The role of central bank balance sheet policies has changed over time as the advanced 
economies went through different phases of the financial and economic cycle. Initially 
such policies focused on providing ample liquidity to stabilise financial markets and shore 
up confidence. These included various term facilities set up by the Federal Reserve and 
also currency swaps agreed upon among central banks. As the crisis subsided, balance 
sheet policies placed greater emphasis on lowering borrowing costs and easing credit 
conditions for the private sector so as to promote growth and employment. Asset purchase 
programmes became more prominent along with central bank commitments to maintain 
very low interest rates for an extended period of time. 
The Federal Reserve has been among the most active central banks in implementing 
balance sheet policies. Its recent quantitative easing measures include: 
• The Large-Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programme, announced in November 2008, 
for purchasing up to USD 600 billion in agency mortgage-backed securities and 
agency debt. From March 2009 to March 2010, the Federal Reserve committed to buy 
an additional USD 850 billion of such securities and USD 300 billion of longer-dated 
Treasury bonds (LSAP1); 
• LSAP2, announced in November 2010, for a further purchases of USD 600 billion in 
longer-term Treasury securities until mid-2011; 
• The Maturity Extension Program (MEP), announced in September 2011, for 
extending the average maturity of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio of Treasury 
securities by 25 months to about 100 months by the end of 2012.6 To do so, the 
Federal Reserve plans to exchange USD 400 billion of Treasuries with residual 
maturities of 3 months to 3 years for those with 6–30 years of residual maturity. 
Using an event study methodology with 1- and 2-day event windows, Meaning and Zhu 
(2011, 2012a) have measured financial market responses to the major announcements of 
the US asset purchase programmes based on cumulative changes in a number of key 
financial indicators. The announcements had an immediate and significant impact on US 
sovereign bond yields across the maturity range during LSAP1. The announcement effects 
were much less pronounced for later programmes. In addition, the impact also affected 
assets other than purchased sovereign bonds. For example, LSAP1 announcements led to 
sizeable reductions in corporate bond yields and prompted significant depreciations in the 
nominal effective exchange rates of the US dollar (7.7% in two days) during LSAP1. 
International spillover effects of central bank asset purchases 
Do the balance sheet measures recently adopted by the Federal Reserve have significant 
international spillover effects? If so, are such effects beneficial or detrimental? The 
answers are not straightforward. In a world of highly integrated finance and trade, leakage 
from domestic policy is unavoidable, although the size of such leakage to the emerging 
economies may differ across countries depending on the strength of cross-border 
transmission channels. 
                                                
6 Meaning and Zhu (2012a, 2012b) examined the impact of changes in the size and maturity structure of 
the Federal Reserve’s Treasury securities holdings on US Treasury bond yields and found that the 
MEP can have a sizeable impact provided that there is no large-scale intervention by the Treasury. 
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One view is that central bank asset purchases, combined with a very loose monetary 
policy stance in both advanced and emerging economies, may further increase the already 
abundant global liquidity. This creates tensions for some emerging economies concerned 
with overheating, inflation and potential financial stability risks. In addition, extraordinary 
monetary stimulus on top of persistent interest rate and growth rate differentials can lead 
to large and volatile capital flows. Such flows may exert strong upward pressure on 
exchange rates, credit growth, and asset prices in the recipient countries. 
Channels of international transmission 
There are several cross-border transmission channels through which central bank balance 
sheet policies may operate. First, there is a global portfolio rebalancing channel, since 
foreign and domestic assets can be imperfect substitutes for each other. For instance, US 
Treasury securities are often perceived as a safe asset and are widely held by global 
investors. As quantitative easing lowers US long-term bond yields, investors are likely to 
adjust their portfolios to include more emerging market assets of similar maturity and risk 
characteristics, boosting asset prices and reducing interest rates in the emerging economies. 
Second, through an exchange rate channel, quantitative easing can exert strong appreciation 
pressures on emerging market currencies against the major international reserve currencies. 
This affects both trade and capital flows. US quantitative easing can also boost exports from 
emerging economies through easier trade financing and increased spending. 
Third, a global liquidity channel operates through bank lending and asset prices. Because 
the global capital market is highly integrated, large-scale asset purchases and commitment 
to very low policy rates for an extended period of time in one economy boosts global 
liquidity. Low interest rates and abundant liquidity create incentives for credit expansion, 
encouraging banks and investors in both advanced and emerging economies to take on 
greater risks. In addition, large and persistent interest rate differentials can spur carry 
trades and capital flows into emerging economies which provide higher risk-adjusted rates 
of return (Figure 2). These forces can lead to significant inflationary pressures on 
consumer and asset prices. 
Figure 2: US capital outflows1 
Total outflows1 Outflows to emerging Asia1, 2 Outflows to Central and South America1, 2 
   
Notes: (1) In billions of US dollars. The figure for 2011 is based on the first two quarters (annualised). (2): US-
owned private assets vis-à-vis emerging Asia / Central and South America. 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the 
 US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Evidence of international spillovers 
The Federal Reserve’s asset purchase programmes have had a broad, immediate, and 
sizeable impact on global financial markets.7 Recent data indicate that, although total US 
capital outflows have not been exceptional since the start of the LSAP programme in 
November 2008, bank lending to emerging Asia and Latin America and flows into those 
regions’ debt securities have increased sharply since 2010 (Figure 2  
Figure 3: Financial market impact of US LSAP programme1 
10-year government bonds yield 2 
 
Exchange rate 5 
 
Equity price6 
 
Notes: (1): Cumulative percentage change two days after the Large Scale Asset Purchase programme 
announcement dates. (2): In basis points. (3): Announcements made on 25 Nov 2008, 1 Dec 2008, 16 Dec 
2008, 28 Jan 2009, 18 Mar 2009, 29 Apr 2009, 24 Jun 2009, 12 Aug 2009, 23 Sep 2009 and 4 Nov 2009. (4): 
Announcements made on 10 Aug 2010, 27 Aug 2010, 21 Sep 2010, 12 Oct 2010, 15 Oct 2010 and 3 Nov 2010. 
(5): A positive change indicates appreciation against the US dollar; in %. (6): In %. 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from Bloomberg and national data. 
                                                
7 Chen, Filardo, He and Zhu (2011) provide a detailed analysis of the global financial impact of the 
announcements of asset purchases by central banks in the advanced economies. 
).
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Based on an event study with a two-day window, Chen et al. (2011) found a significant 
impact in terms of cumulative global financial market responses to the major 
announcements by the Federal Reserve of its asset purchase programmes (Figure 3). First, 
LSAP1 announcements had the greatest impact on sovereign bond yields, reducing the 10-
year yields by an average of over 80 basis points across emerging Asia and Latin America. 
Notably the announcements had a greater impact on yields in many emerging economies 
than in the United States itself. For example, the announcements lowered the 10-year 
yields by over 100 basis points in Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico and Thailand. LSAP1 
announcements reduced corporate bond yields by over 50 basis points in Latin America 
and in other advanced economies. Indeed portfolio rebalancing appeared to be a powerful 
channel of cross-border transmission. 
Second, LSAP1 announcements provided strong support to global stock markets, boosting 
equity prices by over 10% in the emerging markets (
rose by about 20% in Thailand, Hong Kong and India, and by between 10–17% in 
Malaysia, Singapore, Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, Indonesia and Chile. LSAP1 helped 
rebuild confidence and stabilise emerging financial markets. 
Third, emerging market exchange rates tended to strengthen following LSAP1 
announcements. The Korean won, Brazilian real, Chilean peso and Indonesian rupiah 
appreciated by between 10–15% against the US dollar. 
The results also suggest much smaller market reactions to LSAP2 and MEP than those to 
LSAP1. Part of the reduced influence reflects the different sizes of LSAP1, LSAP2 and 
MEP. In addition, the “novelty” or surprise factor associated with LSAP1 might have 
waned over time as markets became better acquainted with quantitative easing, and “more 
of the same” failed to evoke market reactions of similar magnitude. 
Chen et al. (2011) examined the cross-country macroeconomic impact of US quantitative 
easing with a global vector autoregressive (VAR) model, using the US term spread 
between the 10-year Treasury bond yield and the 3-month bill rate as an indicator of post-
crisis monetary policy. They found that large-scale purchases of longer-dated domestic 
assets shrink the US term spread, which in turn influences pricing in global financial 
markets. 
Model estimates indicate that a 23-basis-point reduction in US term spread (one standard 
deviation of US term spread shocks) leads to an almost 2% increase in currency 
appreciation pressure on the Brazilian real over 12 months (Figure 4). The term spread 
shock increases domestic credit in Indonesia by almost 3% and has an even greater impact 
on equity prices. The impact differs across countries, e.g. the impact on Korea is smaller. 
The spillover effects can be perceived as beneficial or harmful in different circumstances. 
In the early stage, with the global economy slipping into a major slowdown, balance sheet 
policies might have contributed to global financial stability and helped emerging 
economies recover by strengthening trade credit and supporting demand. But as many 
emerging economies returned to solid growth, such measures might have increased the 
risks of overheating, high inflation and volatile capital flows there. Moreover, fears of 
disruptive capital inflows and currency appreciation pressures tend to dissuade emerging 
market central banks from raising policy rates. 
Figure
 
            ). In particular, equity prices 3
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Figure 4:  International impact of US monetary easing1 
Forex exchange 2 Domestic credit 2 Equity prices 2 
   
Notes: (1): Estimates are from a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model based on data from January 1996 
to 2010 December. The impulse responses are not significantly different from the GVAR estimates for the 
sample period ending in December 2006, suggesting the international transmission mechanism might have 
largely stayed in place following the global financial crisis. (2): In %. 
Source: Chen et al. (2011). 
Conclusion 
Recent quantitative easing measures by the Federal Reserve significantly reduced yields of 
longer-term government bonds and raised the prices of other financial assets in both advanced 
and emerging economies. Such changes may be accompanied by increased financial 
stability risks in emerging markets arising from cheap money and large and rising global 
liquidity. A sharp balance sheet expansion due to the Federal Reserve’s asset purchases, if it 
persists, may affect inflation expectations globally. Furthermore, it can be difficult for 
central banks to time correctly their unwinding of large asset holdings given uncertainties 
in assessing current economic prospects. The government, with large fiscal deficits to 
finance, may not welcome central bank sales of government bonds. The impact of such 
sales on global markets and the risks of large and sudden reversals of capital inflows to the 
emerging economies are also hard to evaluate. 
Given these caveats, any gains from further quantitative easing have to be weighed against 
possible costs and risks, taking into account their likely externalities. Diverging growth 
prospects in the advanced and emerging economies suggest that the multi-speed recovery 
may persist, and further extraordinary monetary stimulus could represent a challenge for 
many emerging economies. 
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The comovement of international capital flows: evidence from a dynamic factor model 
Marcel Förster, Markus Jorra and Peter Tillmann 
Introduction 
The recent financial crisis in the United States and other advanced economies was 
accompanied by strong swings in global capital flows. Capital flows to emerging countries 
received particular attention and reappeared on the agenda of international financial 
diplomacy. In emerging Asia, for example, economies experienced sharp increases in net 
inflows in response to tensions in the capital markets of advanced economies in 2007 and 
early 2008, followed by net outflows immediately after the failure of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 and massive inflows again thereafter. 
The extent to which capital flows to different countries are linked, i.e. the degree of 
comovement of capital flows, is a key question for policy makers. Put differently, the 
appropriate policy response to capital inflows depends on the driving forces behind capital 
flows. If investors carefully discriminate between countries, thus sending funds as a 
response to the recipient countries’ fundamentals such as growth prospects or as a 
response to returns differentials with respect to advanced economies, capital is said to be 
driven by pull factors. If, however, investors treat emerging countries similarly, 
irrespective of domestic fundamentals, thus responding mostly to global developments 
such as abundant liquidity, financial stress or weak growth prospects in mature economies, 
capital flows are said to be driven by push factors. Moreover, in the past a crisis in one 
country has often been contagious, leading to “sudden stops” of capital inflows or even 
withdrawals in neighbouring or even remote countries. 
Although domestic economic policies may naturally influence pull factors, such policies 
have by definition no impact on the nature and the strength of push factors. The 
Economist (2011) recently argued that flows “may have less to do with [the receiving 
countries’] long-term prospects than with temporary factors such as unusually loose rich-
world monetary policy, over which they have no control.” Therefore, it is important to 
gauge the extent to which flows are correlated on a global level. This chapter seeks to shed 
light on the degree of comovement of capital flows and discusses results from a dynamic 
factor model suitable for disentangling flows for a large set of countries into global, flow-
related, and regional factors. 
The role of global factors in driving capital flows is an unresolved issue. Milesi-Ferretti and 
Tille (2011) have shown that the retrenchment of capital flows at the peak of the financial 
crisis at the end of 2008 was highly heterogeneous across time, across types of flows, and 
across geographic regions. Forbes and Warnock (2011), in contrast, attribute an important role 
to global factors, a somewhat less important role to contagion, and a less prominent role to 
domestic pull factors. While most of the existing studies focus on capital flows with a 
quarterly frequency, the recent study by Fratzscher (2011) is based on portfolio flow data at 
daily, weekly and monthly frequency. Fratzscher shows that idiosyncratic pull factors 
originating in emerging market economies dominated during the recovery from the global 
crisis. In a study prepared for the World Economic Outlook, the IMF (2011) addresses this 
issue. Estimates of time dummies and regional dummies in a simple panel of capital flows 
suggest that a common factor plays a minor role for capital flows. 
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Evidence from a factor model 
To assess the importance of the common components among different types and 
destinations of capital flows, we estimate a dynamic factor model for a large set of 
industrial and emerging economies. The full empirical specification as well as the 
complete set of results can be found in Förster, Jorra and Tillmann (2012). Here we briefly 
present some selected findings. 
In a simple factor model the comovement of observables is captured by a small set of 
factors linked to all variables. This approach has been successfully applied to answer 
diverse research questions using various national macroeconomic data sets, where 
movements of the common factors typically explain a large fraction of the variables’ 
variances. The basic assumptions of the simple model, however, appear less convincing 
in an international setting. Here, regional developments which affect only a subset of 
economies and series are likely to be at least as important as global factors. We therefore 
use the Dynamic Hierarchical Factor Model introduced by Moench and Ng (2011) and 
refined by Moench, Ng and Potter (2011) to address these issues. The model allows us to 
disentangle capital inflows into a global factor, a factor for each type of capital inflow, 
and a regional factor affecting groups of countries. Factors affecting all countries, i.e. 
the global factor as well as the type-specific factors, could be interpreted as push factors. 
The remaining dynamics can then be attributed to regional and idiosyncratic 
determinants, i.e. pull factors. By doing this we can separate country-specific and 
regional-specific variations that would otherwise be spuriously subsumed by the 
estimated global factor. As a result, we can analyse whether global effects, such as 
surges in portfolio or foreign direct investment, or group-specific characteristics such as 
regional investment booms in Eastern Europe, or even the contagious nature of the 
Asian crisis are the driving forces behind a country’s capital inflows. 
Following recent research that highlights the reduced information content of net capital 
flows (Forbes / Warnock 2011; Broner et al. 2011), our focus is on gross inflows measured 
in percent of GDP. We further differentiate between portfolio, foreign direct investment 
and other flows using quarterly data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.8 
After excluding major financial centres we end up with a sample of 47 countries with data 
from 1994Q1 to 2010Q4. Our sample period thus covers the Asian crisis, the debt crises in 
Latin America and Russia, and the recent global financial crisis. 
We construct seasonally adjusted capital-flow-to-GDP series which are generally judged 
stationary according to standard univariate and panel unit root tests. Following the World 
Bank’s classification we then group the country-specific data into four geographical 
blocks: Asia, Emerging Europe, Latin America, and industrialised countries.9 For a given 
type of capital inflow the dynamic factor model estimates a separate block factor for each 
of these country groups. 
 
                                                
8 Given the limited data coverage for emerging economies we augment our data set by adding 
information from a few national sources. 
9 The World Bank’s geographical classification is simplified by merging the “South Asia” and “East 
Asia & Pacific” block into one block (Asia). Furthermore, Israel and South Africa are allocated to the 
Emerging Europe and Asia block, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Capital inflows – regional averages and the global factor 
 
Source: Förster / Jorra / Tillmann (2012). 
A first impression of regional differences with respect to the role of the global factor can be 
obtained from Figure 1, which shows region-specific average capital inflows along with our 
estimate of the global factor. As a first key finding, the global factor extracted from the large 
set of countries closely reflects capital flows to industrial countries and transition economies 
in Eastern Europe. Flows to emerging Asia or Latin America, in turn, appear only loosely 
connected to conditions reflected by the global factor. The financial crises in Asia, Russia 
and Brazil are associated with only a small decline in the global factor. 
As a second result, the factor decomposition reveals the impact of the recent financial 
crisis on international capital flows. At the peak of the crisis the connection between the 
global factor and all flow series intensifies, suggesting that the pattern of comovement 
changes substantially during severe crises. Towards the very end of the sample, flows to 
emerging Europe became disconnected from the global factor, while Latin America shows 
a much stronger link to the global factor than before the crisis. To summarise, the results 
do not support the notion of capital inflows being predominantly pushed into emerging 
economies by global conditions. Deteriorating global economic conditions might, 
however, increase the probability of a sudden stop in capital flows.10 
Conclusions 
Our preliminary results suggest that the global factor does a good job of tracking overall 
capital flow cycles, but leaves a large degree of heterogeneity attributable to either 
regional or country-specific determinants. This suggests that domestic policy has 
                                                
10 For all other findings including variance decompositions, results for different types of capital inflows, 
and many robustness checks the reader is referred to Förster, Jorra and Tillmann (2012). 
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considerable room to affect capital flows and, if this is deemed appropriate, also to limit 
the consequences of capital inflows such as asset price booms and a real appreciation of 
domestic currencies.11 Recently, capital controls have often been seen as the ultima ratio 
in a situation in which a country receives massive capital inflows driven by global 
determinants over which domestic policy has no control. Our results suggest that this is 
less often the case than previously thought. Thus, the primary responsibility for dealing 
with large and volatile capital flows remains with domestic policymakers. 
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Global liquidity and commodity prices 
Ulrich Volz 
Introduction 
The prices of most commodities – including food and other agricultural commodities – 
floated around the same level between 1980 and 2000 but underwent a sharp upturn 
thereafter (Figure 1). Prices peaked in 2008, plunged during the global financial crisis, 
and started a strong rebound at the beginning of 2009. As pointed out in the report that 
the G20 Study Group on Commodities presented at the Cannes Summit in November 
2011, “[t]hese commodity price movements present important policy challenges world-
wide” (G20 2011, 5). In particular, increases in the prices (and price volatility) of food 
and other agricultural commodities can have dire consequences for the world’s poorest 
people.12 Agricultural commodity price developments have therefore stirred an 
intensive public and policy debate and have motivated a flurry of academic research on 
the dynamics which drive food price inflation and volatility and the most appropriate 
policy responses.13 
There have been two major approaches to explaining recent price developments in 
commodity markets. The first explanation centres on supply and demand factors. 
According to Trostle (2008), Krugman (2008), Irwin, Sanders and Merrin (2009), 
Hamilton (2009), Kilian (2009), and others, the rapid growth of emerging market 
economies, not least China and the other BRICS, increased world demand for all kinds of 
commodities including food and oil and led to fast price increases until mid-2008.14 Prices 
crashed when demand contracted sharply with the outbreak of the global financial crisis. 
Other researchers, in contrast, point to a growing presence of financial investors in 
commodity-related markets and a resulting “financialisation” of global commodity 
markets (e.g., Tang / Xiong 2010; Gilbert 2010; UNCTAD 2011) as the underlying reason 
behind these price developments. According to this explanation, an increasingly important 
role of commodities as an asset class for investors has led to large flows of investment into 
commodity markets, especially into index investments and other commodity derivatives, 
and has contributed to growing trading volumes in commodity futures markets. This has 
led to a synchronised boom-and-bust of seemingly unrelated commodity prices, driving 
commodity prices “away from levels justified by market fundamentals, with negative 
effects both on producers and consumers” (UNCTAD 2011, vii). 
                                                
12 Food price increases and volatility affect poor people in different ways (cf. Braun / Tadesse 2012). 
Most importantly, they affect real income and increase income instability. The magnitude of these 
effects depends on the share of income derived from agriculture and the share of food expenditure in a 
household’s budget. 
13 See von Braun and Tadesse (2012) and FAO et al. (2011) for an overview of the problems associated 
with food price inflation and volatility, and for policy recommendations. 
14 In addition to growing demand from emerging economies, supply and demand factors that are 
frequently cited as contributing to price increases in agricultural commodities and a sharp downward 
trend in world aggregate stocks include slower growth in production due to low investment or adverse 
weather conditions, growing demand for biofuels, rising energy prices that increase the costs of 
agricultural production, and protective policies adopted by exporting and importing countries. See, for 
instance, Trostle (2008). 
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Figure 1: Development of commodity and food prices, 1980–2011 
 
Note: CRB: CRB Spot Index (broad index comprising metals, textiles and fibres, fats and oils); CP_food: CRB 
 Foodstuffs (hogs, steers, lard, butter, soybean oil, cocoa, corn, Kansas City wheat, Minneapolis wheat, sugar); 
 CP_livestock: CRB Livestock and Products (hides, hogs, lard, steers, tallow); CP_RI: CRB Raw Industrials 
 (hides, tallow, copper scrap, lead scrap, steel scrap, zinc, tin, burlap, cotton, print cloth, wool tops, rosin, rubber). 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Commodity Research Bureau / Thomson Reuters. 
Is “global liquidity” to blame? 
In a recent paper with Ansgar Belke and Ingo Bordon (Belke / Bordon / Volz 2012), we 
investigated the effects of “global liquidity” – casually defined as the liquidity created by 
the world’s major central banks – on food and commodity prices. Using different 
measures of global liquidity and various indices of commodity and food prices for the 
period 1980–2011, we analysed the interactions between global liquidity and commodity 
and food prices on a global level. For our empirical analysis we used a global cointegrated 
vector-autoregressive model. 
In our analysis we included liquidity and output measures for a group of major advanced 
and emerging economies, representing approximately 80% of world GDP in 2011 and 
presumably a considerably larger share of the global financial markets. We also took into 
account the nominal effective exchange rate of the US dollar to allow for dollar valuation 
effects, and included export data of emerging and developing economies to the rest of the 
world as proxies for demand-driven development of commodity and food prices. In order 
to understand the interactions between monetary aggregates, interest rates, inflation, and 
food and commodity prices on a global level, we mainly focused on long-run equilibrium 
relations. 
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Our results provide insight into the links between monetary policy and commodity and 
food price inflation. We found support for the hypothesis that there is a positive long-term 
relationship between global liquidity and the development of food and commodity prices. 
The latter adjust significantly to the cointegrating relationship and exhibit a long-term co-
movement with liquidity on an international level. Global liquidity, in contrast, does not 
adjust; rather it “drives” the relationship. 
In other words, over the three decades that we observed, food and commodity price 
inflation were apparently driven by monetary expansion in the world’s major economies. 
Our results can be seen as supporting the view of a “financialisation of commodities” in 
which food and commodity prices are impacted to a large extent by flows of (portfolio) 
investment into commodity markets with an eye to returns, and not merely by demand 
from the real economy. Our findings corroborate research by Gilbert (2010, 420), among 
others, who concludes that “index futures investment was the principal channel through 
which monetary and financial activity have affected food prices over recent years”. 
While we are not forecasting food and commodity price developments in our paper, the 
analysis suggests that further price hikes may be in store given current expansionary 
monetary conditions in Europe and the United States. 
Policy options 
Our findings highlight the dilemma that arises when the central banks of all major 
advanced economies engage simultaneously in expansionary monetary policies as a means 
of stabilising the respective economies and financial sectors, causing a large global 
liquidity shock that feeds commodity and food price inflation. While such expansionary 
monetary policies may be necessary to respond to financial crises, economic contraction, 
high unemployment and deflationary tendencies, our analysis suggests that there may be 
pronounced negative side-effects in terms of commodity and food price increases. 
From a policy perspective, what should be done? Whilst expansionary monetary policies are 
indispensable at times of severe economic and financial crisis, policymakers should take into 
account the negative side-effects and consider stricter regulation of commodity markets, 
especially agricultural commodity markets, in order to prevent a further flow of liquidity into 
these markets. In spite of differing views on the role of speculation in driving commodity 
prices, a broad consensus exists regarding the need to improve information and transparency 
in commodity futures markets, particularly in over-the-counter (OTC) markets (see e.g. FAO 
et al. 2011). Building on this consensus, regulatory authorities should swiftly implement the 
“Principles for the regulation and supervision of commodity derivatives markets” (IOSCO 
2011) prepared by the IOSCO Task Force on Commodity Futures Markets at the request of 
the G20 leaders at the Seoul Summit in November 2010. 
Building on and going beyond the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) principles, several concrete measures should be considered to enhance 
transparency and improve the functioning of commodity markets – and curtail the flow of 
liquidity into these markets:15 (i) registration of all OTC derivative trades in a trade 
repository; (ii) imposition of appropriate position limits on individual market participants 
                                                
15 See also the recommendations in UNCTAD (2011) and FAO et al (2011). 
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in order to restrain the engagement of non-commercial investors in commodity markets; 
(iii) regulation of high volume and frequency trading in commodity markets, and (iv) 
introduction of a marginal transaction tax for all transactions in commodity markets. Such 
measures, if introduced in all major markets, would discourage non-commercial 
participants such as commodity index funds, swap dealers, and money managers who have 
no involvement in the physical commodity trade (in contrast to commercial participants 
such as farmers, traders and processors) from “excessive” speculation in commodity 
markets. These regulatory provisions could be adjusted over time, to allow for changing 
market conditions and new insights into their effectiveness and to limit potential 
unintended side-effects. 
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Foreign banks and financial stability: lessons from the Great Recession 
Ralph De Haas 
Introduction 
The rapid process of financial globalisation over the past three decades has resulted in 
high levels of foreign direct investment in banking sectors across the world (Figure 1). 
Spanish and Portuguese banks have developed a stronghold in Latin America on the back 
of cultural and trade links between this region and the Iberian Peninsula. Nigerian and 
South African banks have created pan-African banks, while various European banks 
operate African affiliates as well. In New Zealand, most banking assets are currently 
owned by foreign, mainly Australian banks. 
Yet banking integration has perhaps advanced the most between Western and Eastern 
Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Western European banks bought former state 
banks and opened new affiliates, both branches and subsidiaries, across Emerging Europe. 
Banks with saturated home markets were attracted to the region due to its scope for further 
financial deepening at high margins. Policy makers stimulated banking integration 
because of the presumed positive impact on both the efficiency and stability of local 
banking sectors. Figure 1 shows that, as a result, in many Eastern European countries 
between 67% and 100% of all banking assets are now in foreign hands. 
Figure 1: Foreign banks around the world 
 
Note: Foreign-bank assets are shown as a percentage of total banking assets. 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from Claessens and Van Horen (2012) and EBRD. 
What are the economic implications of this dominant role for foreign banks? To 
answer this question, we first briefly review the pre-crisis academic literature on 
foreign bank entry into emerging markets. We then discuss new empirical evidence 
that emerged after the 2008–09 financial crisis as well as the implications of this 
evidence for economic policy. 
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Pros and cons of foreign banks in emerging markets 
Academic and policy discussions about the economic impact of foreign banks on 
emerging markets typically focus on three topics: changes in the quantity, the efficiency, 
and the stability of financial intermediation. We discuss these in turn. 
Foreign bank entry and the quantity of financial intermediation 
Foreign bank entry into emerging markets can help unlock access to foreign savings, 
increase investments, and speed up economic convergence. Although less capital tends to 
flow from rich to poor countries than theory would predict, Emerging Europe is one of the 
few regions where the Lucas paradox does not apply. Facilitated by the presence of 
foreign banks, the transition region has been quite successful in accessing foreign savings, 
using these to fund local business opportunities, and moving more quickly towards 
Western European living standards than would otherwise have been possible.16 
Foreign bank entry and the efficiency of financial intermediation 
Foreign banks may not only expand the amount of available savings, they may also 
transform savings more efficiently into investments. In emerging markets, foreign banks 
often introduce superior lending technologies and marketing know-how, developed for 
domestic use, at low marginal cost (Grubel 1977).17 Evidence suggests that Emerging 
Europe, where commercial banks were still largely absent at the start of the 1990s, has 
reaped substantial efficiency gains due to foreign entry.18 Foreign banks are not only 
efficient themselves but also generate positive spillovers to domestic banks (which for 
instance copy risk management methodologies). 
An important issue is whether this higher efficiency comes at the cost of a narrower client 
base. Foreign banks may simply be more efficient because they cherry-pick the best 
customers and leave more difficult clients – such as opaque small- and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) – to domestic banks. Domestic lenders may be better positioned to 
collect and use “soft” information about opaque clients (Berger / Udell 1995) whereas 
foreign banks rely more on standardised lending technologies. Some evidence 
consequently indicates that foreign banks are associated with a relative decline in SME 
lending (Detragiache / Tressel / Gupta 2008; Gormley 2010; Beck / Martinez Peria 2010). 
Nevertheless, foreign banks increasingly apply technologies that use hard information, 
such as credit scoring, to lend to SMEs without the need to develop long-term lending 
relationships. Some recent studies therefore find that foreign banks may increase SME 
lending in the medium term as they adopt new lending technologies (De la Torre / 
Martinez Peria / Schmukler 2010). For Emerging Europe, the evidence also suggests that 
foreign bank entry has not led to a reduced availability of small business lending (De Haas / 
Ferreira / Taci 2006; De Haas / Naaborg 2006; Giannetti / Ongena 2008). 
                                                
16 See EBRD (2009, Chapter 3) and Gill / Raiser (2012, Chapter 3) for empirical evidence. 
17 In developed countries, foreign banks are generally less efficient than domestic banks as the 
advantages of incumbent banks tend to dominate those of new entrants (Claessens / Demirgüç-Kunt / 
Huizinga 2001). 
18 See for instance Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005), Fries and Taci (2005), and Havrylchyk and Jurzyk 
(2011). 
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Foreign bank entry and the stability of financial intermediation 
Even if foreign bank entry is associated with more (and more efficiently delivered) credit, 
this advantage may be partly offset if that lending is highly volatile and contributes to 
economic instability. The empirical evidence on this issue focuses on three impacts that 
banking integration can have on financial stability in host countries. 
First, there is abundant evidence that foreign banks have a stabilising effect on aggregate 
lending during local bouts of financial turmoil.19 Compared to stand-alone domestic 
banks, foreign bank subsidiaries tend to have access to supportive parent banks that 
provide liquidity and capital if and when needed. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) 
confirm such a stabilising role for Emerging Europe, and De Haas and Van Lelyveld 
(2010) for a broader set of countries. 
Second, foreign bank entry may expose a country to foreign shocks. Because parent banks 
reallocate capital across borders (Morgan / Rime / Strahan 2004), capital may be 
withdrawn from country A when it is needed in country B. Peek and Rosengren (1997, 
2000a) show how the drop in Japanese stock prices starting in 1990, combined with 
binding capital requirements, led Japanese bank branches in the United States to reduce 
credit. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find that banks that are exposed to a financial 
shock in either their home country or another country reduce credit in their (other) host 
countries. Schnabl (2012) shows how the 1998 Russian crisis spilled over to Peru, as 
banks – including foreign-owned ones – saw their foreign funding dry up and had to cut 
back lending. 
While foreign bank subsidiaries can transmit foreign shocks, lending by such local brick-
and-mortar affiliates is still considerably less volatile than cross-border lending by foreign 
banks (García Herrero / Martinez Peria 2007). Peek and Rosengren (2000) find for Latin 
America that cross-border lending did in some cases diminish during economic 
slowdowns, whereas local lending by foreign banks was much more stable. Similarly, De 
Haas and Van Lelyveld (2004) find that reductions in cross-border credit to Emerging 
Europe have generally been met by increased lending by foreign bank subsidiaries, either 
because new subsidiaries were established or because the lending of existing affiliates 
increased. 
Third, foreign bank ownership may also affect the sensitivity of the aggregate credit 
supply to the business cycle. Because multinational banks trade off lending opportunities 
across countries, foreign bank subsidiaries tend to be more sensitive to the local business 
cycle than domestic banks (Barajas / Steiner 2002; Morgan / Strahan 2004). However, if 
the population of foreign banks in a country is sufficiently diverse in terms of home 
countries, this diversity may make aggregate lending more stable. In line with this, Arena, 
Reinhart and Vázquez (2007) argue on the basis of a dataset comprising 20 emerging 
markets that the presence of foreign banks has contributed somewhat to overall bank 
lending stability in these countries. 
                                                
19 See Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000); Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg (2002); Peek and Rosengren 
(2000b); Goldberg (2001); Martinez Peria, Powell, and Vladkova Hollar (2002); and Cull and 
Martinez Peria (2007). 
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To sum up, the empirical evidence available before the 2008–09 crisis suggests the 
following: 
(1) Foreign banks improve credit availability in emerging markets and make the delivery of 
credit more efficient. At least in the short term, small firms may benefit less from this. 
(2) Foreign bank entry may exacerbate business and credit cycles, in particular if parent 
banks are mostly from the same home country or region. 
(3) Foreign bank entry reduces the economic impact of local financial crises. 
(4) Foreign bank entry increases the vulnerability of a country to foreign shocks. 
New evidence from the Great Recession 
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on 15 September 2008 triggered a flurry of research into 
how multinational banks transmitted this unexpected shock across borders. Many of these 
banks were either directly exposed to the sub-prime market or indirectly affected by the 
US dollar illiquidity. It became more difficult for parent banks to support their foreign 
subsidiary networks with capital and liquidity, and this had knock-on effects for Emerging 
Europe. 
Popov and Udell (2012) show how Western banks with relatively little capital and high 
financial losses propagated the crisis by reducing the credit supply of their Eastern 
European subsidiaries. Opaque firms with few tangible assets were affected the most. In 
line with this, De Haas, Korniyenko, Loukoianova and Pivovarsky (2012) find that foreign 
bank subsidiaries in Emerging Europe reduced lending earlier and faster than domestic 
banks.20 Yet foreign banks that took part in the “Vienna Initiative” were somewhat more 
stable lenders.21 
The stabilizing effect of the Vienna Initiative is confirmed by Cetorelli and Goldberg 
(2011a) on the basis of aggregate data from the Bank for International Settlements. They 
find that multinational banks transmitted the crisis to emerging markets via a reduction in 
cross-border lending22 and local subsidiary lending. Importantly, stand-alone domestic 
banks – many of which had borrowed heavily on the international syndicated loan and 
bond markets before the crisis – were forced to contract credit as well. Ongena, Peydró-
Alcalde and Van Horen (2012) also stress the funding heterogeneity among domestic 
banks in Emerging Europe. Wholesale-funded domestic banks were much less stable than 
domestic banks that relied on deposit funding. Similarly, Rocholl, Puri and Steffen (2011) 
show how German Landesbanken with US sub-prime exposures reduced retail credit more 
than unaffected banks. This was especially true for domestic banks that relied on 
wholesale rather than deposit funding. 
                                                
20 Barba Navaretti et al. (2010) argue that multinational banks were a stabilising force as they displayed 
a stable loan-to-deposit ratio. Their analysis is limited to the years 2007–08, while much of the credit 
crunch took place in 2008–09. 
21 The Vienna Initiative was established towards the end of 2008 as a public-private coordination 
mechanism to guarantee macroeconomic stability in Emerging Europe. Various multinational banks 
signed country-specific commitment letters in which they pledged to maintain exposures and to 
provide subsidiaries with adequate funding. 
22 See De Haas and Van Horen (2011, 2012) for evidence on the rapid decline in cross-border lending 
during the 2008-09 crisis, in particular by distant and relatively inexperienced international lenders. 
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Outside Europe, multinational banks also contributed to crisis transmission. De Haas and 
Van Lelyveld (2011) analyse an international sample of banks and find that during the 
recent crisis multinational bank subsidiaries had to curtail credit growth about twice as 
much as stand-alone domestic banks. The latter relied more on deposits and were better 
positioned to continue to lend. Subsidiaries of parent banks that used more wholesale 
funding had to reduce credit the most. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011b) find that US banks 
with a high pre-crisis exposure to asset-backed commercial papers became more 
constrained when off-balance sheet commitments became on-balance sheet commitments. 
This affected foreign affiliates as funds were reallocated towards the parent, although this 
effect was mitigated for large “core” affiliates. Finally, Kamil and Rai (2010) show that 
crisis transmission to Latin America was less severe in countries where foreign banks 
were lending through subsidiaries rather than across borders. Subsidiaries that had mostly 
funded themselves locally and to a lesser extent through international wholesale markets 
or through their parent banks were particularly stable credit sources. 
Policy lessons from the Great Recession 
When we compare the pre-crisis evidence on the impact of foreign bank entry on financial 
stability with more recent findings, two lessons stand out. 
First, the crisis underlined the importance of funding structures for banking stability. In 
particular, it has become clear that an excessive use of wholesale funding exposes banks to 
bouts of illiquidity in wholesale markets. Before the crisis, policy makers and academics 
had focused instead on the potentially adverse effects of depositor runs, largely ignoring 
the risks in the increasingly important wholesale markets. 
The recent crisis also made it clear that funding structures matter for both foreign and 
domestic banks. While foreign banks had easy access to parent bank and wholesale 
funding, many domestic banks were increasingly able to access international wholesale 
markets as well. When the crisis struck, it was these domestic banks that felt the pinch the 
most and turned out to be the weakest links. They almost immediately lost access to cross-
border borrowing and had no recourse to a supportive group structure. 
Important funding differences came to the fore among foreign bank subsidiaries as well. 
The Latin American experience has shown that deep financial integration through a large-
scale presence of foreign banks may go hand in hand with financial stability if sufficient 
local deposit and wholesale funding is available. Some (but not all) multinational bank 
subsidiaries in Emerging Europe may have to adjust their funding model in this direction. 
These subsidiaries will increasingly have to stand on their own financial feet by raising 
local customer deposits and topping these up with wholesale funding if and when 
required. This will be easier for and more relevant to subsidiaries that target retail rather 
than corporate clients. 
To make an increased focus on local funding a realistic option, some countries have more 
work to do in terms of developing credible macroeconomic frameworks – including 
flexible exchange rate regimes and inflation targeting – that facilitate the development of 
local-currency bond markets (see Zettelmeyer / Nagy / Jeffrey 2010). Such frameworks 
have helped Latin America to de-dollarise and subsequently create a more stable form of 
financial integration. Adherence to credible macroeconomic policies will also help foster a 
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local-currency deposit base and reduce the need for banks, both foreign and domestic, to 
borrow and lend in foreign exchange (Brown / De Haas 2012). 
Second, while the Japanese experience of the 1990’s had already shown (or perhaps 
forewarned) that multinational banks may pass on shocks from home to host countries, 
what remained underappreciated until recently is how large these effects can be if foreign 
bank affiliates are of local systemic importance. Nowhere has this been more evident than 
in Emerging Europe where in many countries one or several of the top 3 banks are in 
foreign hands. It was this combination of foreign ownership and systemic importance that 
threatened financial stability in the region and necessitated the ad hoc establishment of the 
Vienna Initiative. It also highlighted the inadequacies in the supervisory framework for 
multinational banking groups. 
Better coordination, cooperation, and information-exchange between supervisors are not 
only necessary to prevent shock spillovers, but also because the alternative – forcing 
banks to cut up their subsidiary networks into strings of completely independent banks – 
may be costly. Such fully “ring-fenced” subsidiaries are costly to the bank groups 
themselves, because the sum of ring-fenced pools of capital will be larger than the current 
group capital as banks can no longer exploit the benefits of international diversification. 
There may be costs at the macroeconomic level too as banks can no longer use their 
internal capital market to raise funding where it is cheapest and must allocate it to the 
most worthy investment projects. 
Ideally, one would therefore like to move towards an integrated supervisory regime that 
would still allow banks to operate multinational networks through which capital and 
liquidity can be allocated according to their most productive uses. Prudential limits on 
subsidiaries’ foreign funding (i.e. partial “ring-fencing”) may then cushion the cross-
border transmission of future financial shocks. At a minimum, such supervisory 
“integration” could take the form of more harmonisation and the creation of a level 
playing field, strengthening the colleges of supervisors on multinational banks, as well as 
setting up (ex ante and binding) burden-sharing agreements (Goodhart / Schoenmaker 
2009). The most far-reaching solution would entail the creation of a pan-European 
supervisor for large groups. Whatever option is chosen, forced subsidiarisation through 
full ring-fencing may be second-best and may reflect the inability of national supervisors 
to reach a satisfactory level of cross-border cooperation and burden-sharing. 
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Emerging market economies after the crisis: trapped by global liquidity?∗ 
Anton Korinek 
Four years after the global financial crisis of 2008–09, the advanced economies of the 
United States, Europe and Japan are still in a liquidity trap, where zero nominal interest 
rates are insufficient to raise output to its potential level. Central bankers have provided 
ample liquidity to their ailing economies through various forms of monetary easing. 
Although the target of these actions has been domestic, their effects are felt worldwide. 
Global investors have used part of the additional liquidity to invest abroad, leading to 
massive capital flows to emerging market economies, thus driving up exchange rates and 
inflating asset prices. 
Policymakers in the affected economies have justifiably been worried about the 
consequences: as Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) have pointed out, massive capital inflows 
are all too often followed by severe crashes that impose enormous social costs. 
Furthermore, policymakers felt that if they followed the standard prescriptions for cooling 
down their overheating economies – i.e. cutting government spending or raising domestic 
interest rates – they would make themselves even more attractive to global investors and 
risk a further increase in capital inflows. In short, they felt “trapped by global liquidity”. 
A growing chorus of academics, perhaps most famously reflected in Stiglitz (2002), has 
argued that emerging economies should therefore impose regulations on international 
capital flows. Country after country, from Brazil to Indonesia, Korea, Peru, Taiwan and 
Thailand, has followed their advice in recent years. In a notable reversal of earlier policies, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has given its blessing to capital controls under 
certain circumstances (see Ostry et al. 2010). 
Externalities of capital flows 
Korinek (2010b) makes the welfare-theoretic case for regulating capital flows based on 
the notion that such flows impose externalities on the recipient countries. Just as 
environmental pollution produces externalities that reduce societal well-being if 
unregulated, capital inflows to emerging markets produce externalities that make such 
economies more prone to financial instability and crises. By implication policymakers can 
make everybody better off (i.e. achieve a Pareto-improvement) by regulating and 
discouraging the use of risky forms of external finance, in particular foreign currency-
denominated debts. 
Risky forms of capital inflows create externalities because individual borrowers find it 
best to ignore the effects of their financing decisions on aggregate financial stability. They 
take the risk of financial crisis in their economy as a given and do not recognise that their 
individual actions contribute to this risk. In a way they face a “prisoners’ dilemma” – if 
they could all agree to use less risky financing instruments and less external finance 
                                                
∗ This article is partially based on Korinek (2010a, b, 2011b, 2012). For background papers please visit 
http://www.korinek.com 
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overall, the economy as a whole would become more stable and everybody would be 
better off. This creates a natural role for policy intervention. 
Mechanism of financial crises 
The economic rationale for capital flow regulations derives from a specific market 
imperfection that plays a crucial role during emerging market financial crises: international 
investors typically demand explicit or implicit collateral when providing finance. However, 
the value of most of a country’s collateral depends on exchange rates: it rises in good times 
when exchange rates appreciate; it declines in bad times when exchange rates depreciate but 
when access to finance is most needed. When an emerging economy is hit by an adverse 
economic shock, its exchange rate depreciates, the value of its domestic collateral declines, 
and international investors become reluctant to roll over their debts. The resulting capital 
outflows depreciate the exchange rate even further and trigger an adverse feedback cycle of 
declining collateral values, capital outflows, and falling exchange rates (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Feedback loops during emerging market crises 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
This financial feedback loop, sometimes referred to as Fisherian debt deflation or simply 
as the deleveraging cycle, can amplify economic shocks so that a relatively small initial 
shock leads to large declines in exchange rates, borrowing capacity, and economic activity 
coupled with large capital outflows. As shown in Korinek (2010b), rational private agents 
do not internalise their contribution to such feedback loops and therefore impose 
externalities on the rest of the economy. 
Magnitude of externalities 
This theory of externalities based on financial vulnerabilities provides a clear framework 
for how to determine the optimum magnitude of policy measures. The reason why capital 
inflows expose an economy to financial fragility is that they may reverse precisely when 
the economy is experiencing financial difficulty and trigger the described feedback loops. 
Different forms of capital inflows result in different probabilities of future capital outflows 
and different payoff characteristics in the event of a crisis; this in turn leads to different 
externalities. Optimal macroprudential policy should aim precisely at offsetting these 
externalities. 
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If an emerging economy takes on dollar debts and subsequently experiences a financial 
crisis, the exchange rate depreciates and the domestic value of the debt increases sharply, 
implying that dollar debt imposes a large negative externality. Consumer price inflation 
(CPI)-indexed debt protects borrowers against the risk of exchange rate fluctuations, 
imposing smaller externalities. Local currency debts and portfolio investments play an 
insurance role, since both the value of the local currency and equity markets tend to go 
down during crises. Finally, non-financial foreign direct investment (FDI) often stays in the 
country when a financial crisis hits; in those instances it does not impose any externalities. 
Figure 2 reports a sample estimation of the annual magnitude of externalities created by 
various types of capital inflow to Indonesia (see Korinek (2010b) for a detailed description 
of the analytical method employed). For each type of capital flow, the blue bar to the left 
represents the average magnitude of externalities over the past two decades, whereas the 
red bar on the right captures the externalities imposed during the 1997–98 financial crisis. 
Figure 2: Feedback loops during emerging market crises 
 
Source: Korinek (2010b). 
Dollar debt, for example, imposed a long-run average externality of 1.54% annually on the 
Indonesian economy over the past two decades. However, during the East Asian crisis of 
1997–98, the externality reached 30.70%, justifying a tax of equal magnitude on the eve of 
the crisis. More generally, optimal policy measures on capital inflows should be regularly 
adjusted for changes in the financial vulnerability of the economy (see Jeanne / Korinek, 
2010). The externalities of foreign capital rise during booms, when leverage increases and 
financial imbalances build up. After a crisis has occurred and economies have de-levered, 
new capital inflows create smaller externalities, justifying a zero tax in bad times when a 
country seeks to attract more capital. Optimal capital flow regulation should therefore be 
strongly procyclical. For dollar debt, a tax between 0% and 30%, with an average of 1.5%, 
can be justified for the case of Indonesia. 
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International spillover effects of capital controls 
When one emerging economy imposes capital controls, capital is naturally diverted to 
other countries, as documented e.g. by Forbes et al. (2011) and Lambert, Ramos-Tallada 
and Rebillard (2011). The economic mechanism for this is simple: if a country such as 
Brazil imposes a new tax on capital inflows, then Brazil’s demand for capital declines. But 
given the lower demand, the world interest rate must fall to re-equilibrate the market: at a 
lower world interest rate, worldwide investors will find it less enticing to save, i.e. supply 
is lower, and other countries find it more attractive to borrow, i.e. demand is higher.  
As discussed in Korinek (2012), the decline in the world interest rate is the natural 
mechanism through which the market re-equilibrates demand and supply and is necessary 
to clear markets. Technically speaking, we may call the decline in the world interest rate a 
pecuniary externality, but we know from the first welfare theorem that pecuniary 
externalities do not matter for Pareto efficiency in a well-functioning and relatively 
complete market, such as the world market for capital. In short, the diversion of capital 
from Brazil to other countries is the efficient response of the market system to the new 
balance of supply and demand for capital. 
Since the described spillover effects of capital controls are Pareto efficient, it follows that it 
is neither necessary nor desirable to control them. In fact, welfare would be reduced if the 
world interest rate was not allowed to adjust in response to capital controls, and if capital 
was not allowed to seek its next-best destination. The pecuniary externalities arising from 
optimal capital controls should therefore not be subjected to international oversight. 
However, in many instances, the recipients of the capital flows diverted from Brazil are 
themselves emerging economies that struggle with a flood of capital inflows. This has led 
to concerns that Brazilian capital controls may have “bubble-thy-neighbour” effects on 
other countries, as expressed e.g. in Forbes et al. (2011). In response to an increase in 
Brazilian capital controls, the supply of capital to Brazil’s neighbours increases and the 
interest rate at which they can borrow declines.  
Arms race of capital controls 
If Brazil’s neighbours also suffer from the described financial stability externalities, then 
this increased supply is a mixed blessing: it reduces the interest rate that countries pay on 
their loans, but it also increases the danger of financial instability and the associated 
externalities. However, as Korinek (2012) describes, they can simply respond to this 
higher danger by imposing or raising capital controls of their own. 
The result may look like an arms race, but is actually the efficient equilibrating process (or 
tatonnement process) of the market: in response to Brazilian controls, capital flows are 
diverted and generate greater externalities in neighbouring countries, e.g. Peru. As a result, it 
may be best for Peru to impose capital controls, which in turn pushes some of the capital 
back to Brazil. This may lead to yet higher capital controls in Brazil, and so forth. The end 
result is that each country converges to its optimal level of capital flows and capital controls. 
The findings so far are based on the premise that countries are able to effectively 
implement capital controls – if policymakers faced externalities but did not have the 
policy tools to address them, then the resulting equilibrium would be inefficient.  
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Korinek (2012) studies a number of situations in which the effectiveness of capital 
controls can be increased via concerted action among source and destination countries. 
First, if capital controls are costly and the marginal cost increases in accordance with the 
magnitude of the controls, for example because they create ever-greater incentives for 
circumvention, then it may be desirable to share the burden of regulation between source 
and destination country. Secondly, if source countries are better able to distinguish 
between risky and safe forms of capital flows than destination countries, for example 
because authorities in the source country have regulatory control over the banks from 
which the flows originate, then it is of course desirable to involve source country 
authorities in the regulatory process. 
Involving the authorities of the source countries may be desirable for an additional reason: 
when policymakers impose taxes on capital flows, they collect tax revenue. By the same 
token, when policymakers impose quantity restrictions on capital flows, the agents who 
are subject to the restrictions earn an implicit rent. If capital flows are partially restricted 
by regulators in source countries, they are the ones who can collect the tax revenue. 
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Capital account management: the Indian experience and its lessons 
Y. Venugopal Reddy 
Until 1992, India had tight control over its capital and current accounts. As part of the 
reforms that were implemented following the 1991 currency crisis, a new regime of external 
sector management was adopted. This was based on the report of a high-level committee 
concerning the balance of payments. The major features of the regime involved (a) a full 
liberalisation of the current account; (b) restricting the current account deficit to a 
sustainable level, assessed through the level of normal capital flows (initially placed at 2% 
of Gross Domestic Product [GDP]); and (c) an active management of the capital account. 
The regime also involved efforts to build up foreign exchange reserves to an appropriate 
level, taking into account not only import needs but also overall payment obligations in 
the short-term. In managing the capital account, priority was given to non-debt inflows 
over debt inflows. With respect to debt, short-term debt was not permitted except for 
trade-related purposes. The possibility of capital account transactions being undertaken in 
the guise of current account transactions was noted. Hence, appropriate safeguards were 
provided. These included repatriation and surrender requirements for export earnings, and 
reasonable monetary limits on automatic access to current account transactions in services. 
These measures were followed up with appropriate legislative changes to strengthen the 
framework. In particular, India’s Foreign Exchange Control and Regulation Act was 
replaced by the Foreign Exchange Management Act. At that time, when this framework 
was put in place, the idea was to ensure a non-disruptive movement of India’s economy to 
greater integration with the rest of the world economy, as considered appropriate. In this 
regard, while the appropriateness of immediate current account convertibility was 
recognised, the approach to capital account liberalisation was somewhat ambivalent. The 
law assured full current account convertibility as a rule, with scope for exceptions, and 
empowered the Reserve Bank of India to manage the country’s capital account with the 
approval of government. 
In 1997, there was a widespread feeling that full capital account convertibility should be a 
natural corollary of the reform process undertaken in 1991–1992. However, there were 
apprehensions about the possible risks of sudden and full capital account convertibility, 
and the need to undertake capital account liberalisation in accordance with progress in 
fiscal consolidation, the level of foreign exchange reserves, and reforms in the banking 
system, especially with regard to the problem of too high a level of non-performing assets. 
A committee appointed to recommend measures for capital account convertibility 
presented a set of preconditions for full convertibility and a road map to that goal. 
With the onset of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, extensive use was made of 
administrative measures regarding financial flows into the capital account. Intervention in 
the foreign exchange markets was undertaken by the Reserve Bank through public sector 
commercial banks. Due to the imposition of harsh economic sanctions by the US 
government in May 1998 (a response to India’s detonation of nuclear devices), special 
mechanisms were considered for obtaining capital flows from non-resident Indians 
through the issuance of bonds. In brief, the range of instruments for managing volatility in 
financial markets, in particular foreign exchange markets, increased. 
Financial stability in emerging markets: dealing with global liquidity Ulrich Volz (ed.) 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 41 
In 2003 there was some apprehensiveness that excessive capital inflows might destabilise 
the Indian economy. In order to counter this, several steps were taken which included 
tightening the limits on external commercial borrowing by corporations and the rules for 
approval of this. In any case, there was no outstanding sovereign debt in foreign currency, 
except through bilateral or multi-lateral aid institutions. There were strict limits on the 
holding of sovereign debt by non-residents. During this period, the approach to capital 
account management included a formal distinction between households, corporations and 
the financial sector regarding the pace and extent of liberalisation of the capital account. 
Prudential regulations and regulations on capital transactions over the financial sector 
were liberalised in a very cautious manner. There was greater liberalisation (though with 
some limits on overseas exposure in connection with the net worth of a corporation) for 
operations of resident real sector corporations, particularly regarding the acquisition of 
equity in the form of foreign direct outward investment by Indian corporations. This 
process enabled a large number of Indian corporations to make acquisitions outside the 
country, and thus relieved the pressure caused by capital inflows into the economy. The 
limited cross-border operations of non-financial firms were considered more stable than 
those undertaken by the financial sector. The restrictions on foreign exchange transactions 
of individual households were liberalised, but the mobilisation of household savings for 
purposes of capital account transactions by financial intermediaries was restricted. 
In view of the size and volatility of the capital inflows that were anticipated during 2004, 
and the possible cost of intervention in the foreign exchange markets, an innovative 
“market stabilisation scheme” was introduced. Basically, this scheme is a substitute for 
bond issues by the central bank for sterilisation with government bonds. This scheme 
permitted what would normally have been a quasi-fiscal burden of sterilisation operations 
to be more transparent and to be reflected in the government budget. This also promoted a 
careful assessment of the costs and benefits of capital account management by the 
government. The bonds issued are no different from treasury bonds, except that a specified 
amount for sterilisation is transparently frozen and not utilised by the government. These 
operations were reversed, however, when the global financial crisis struck in 2008. The 
pace of liberalisation of the capital account was also coordinated with the countercyclical 
policies that were undertaken both by monetary policy and in regulation of the financial 
sector. In undertaking these measures, the inadequacies of interest rates and fiscal tools by 
themselves in countering volatility were recognised. Furthermore the objective was to 
avoid commitment to a predetermined level of the exchange rate, but rather to moderate 
excessive volatility. What “excess volatility” means has never been defined, but over time 
larger movements in exchange rate were tolerated. Thus the boundaries between volatility 
and flexibility were not rigidly defined. The major criticism of this system has been that the 
scheme compromises the independence of the central bank. However, the position taken by 
the Reserve Bank has been that this compromise in favour of coordination was essential in 
order to manage the “trilemma”, the impossibility of having a fixed exchange rate, a fully 
liberalised capital account, and an independent monetary policy at the same time. 
By 2006, pressure mounted on the Reserve Bank to liberalise the country’s capital account 
further, and hence another committee was appointed. This committee recommended 
further relaxation of capital account management, but the framework of 2003 remained in 
place. In conformity with the global fascination for accelerated growth in the financial 
sector, the Indian government appointed a committee to suggest measures for making 
Mumbai a regional international financial centre; and another committee to make 
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recommendations on comprehensive reforms in the financial and external sectors. The two 
reports, which were submitted in 2008, remain largely unimplemented today. 
With the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, instruments of external borrowing, 
including short-term debt, were used to increase capital inflows. Similarly, the ceiling on 
interest rates offered by commercial banks for deposits from non-residents, both in foreign 
currency and in domestic currency, was raised. Permissions for external commercial 
borrowing were issued more liberally. Financial intermediaries were able to revise foreign 
currency resources more liberally. These measures, supplemented by interventions in the 
foreign exchange market by the Reserve Bank and the reversal of operations under the 
“market stabilisation scheme”, helped moderate volatility in the exchange rate in Indian 
markets, despite the huge impact of the global financial crisis on global liquidity. 
Lessons of the Indian experience 
On the basis of the Indian experience with capital account management, the following 
lessons may be drawn, recognising that these lessons may not be of universal validity: 
First, it is necessary to integrate management of the capital account with other policies, 
especially fiscal management, regulation of the financial sector, and monetary policy. In 
2006, the Reserve Bank mooted serious consideration of a tax on transactions in the 
financial sector, but this did not find favour with government. It is possible to maintain 
that such supplementary policies might have moderated the cost of sterilisation.  
Second, capital account management should be treated as an essential component of 
countercyclical policies. For example, the Indian real estate bubble was moderated 
through regulation of the financial sector, but the government remained reluctant to 
impose adequate restrictions regarding capital inflows. This impacted to some extent on 
asset quality, in spite of the limited exposure of banks, when the correction took place in 
2008–2009.  
Third, management of the capital account cannot be divorced from developments in 
foreign exchange markets as well as developments in the current account.  
Fourth, it is necessary to ensure that there is full commitment on the part of public policy-
makers both at the level of the government and the central bank to manage the capital 
account actively and to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of such a policy. This 
policy commitment is essential to resisting the inherent tendency of market participants to 
counter such actions. Many market participants tend to gain from excess volatility until a 
collapse is feared and at that stage, there may be an appeal from them for policy 
intervention in one form or another. 
Fifth, capital account management may involve both price and administrative measures, 
and these measures should not be confined to managing inflows, but should also include 
the management of outflows whenever appropriate. 
Sixth, it is necessary to recognise that in developing countries the capacity of the central 
bank to intervene at the time of a currency depreciation is limited by constraints in the 
availability of foreign exchange reserves. The central bank has a greater capacity to 
intervene at times of appreciation, since purchases are made with its own currency, over 
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which there are no supply constraints. Hence, any policy involving a reduction in volatility 
must exercise the necessary caution in the strategies adopted in both cases. Further, in the 
face of limitations on effective management of depreciation, there is an enhanced need to 
moderate excessive appreciating pressures in order to avoid possible over-shooting and 
disruptive corrections. 
Seventh, the nature of capital flows and the complexity of the operations of financial 
intermediaries keep changing, and hence there should be sufficient flexibility for 
modifying these measures and altering the relative priorities among them. 
Eighth, it should be clear that capital account management is a tool that is necessary at all 
times, even when recourse to it is taken as a purely temporary measure. Furthermore, the 
perception that the central bank is credibly committed to avoiding excess volatility has an 
influence on the expectations and actions of market participants. In fact, treating capital 
account management as a temporary measure would imply that recourse to the former is 
itself a sign of recognition of a problem. 
Ninth, the critical part of management of the capital account relates to the financial sector, 
where the stability of financial institutions and the exchange rate are closely intertwined. 
Hence, the most important instrument of capital account management should of necessity 
be regulation of the financial sector. In this regard, the operations of financial institutions 
which concentrate on cross-border transactions require special monitoring and intense 
regulation. Their operations have a tendency to overtly and covertly undermine efforts 
aimed at capital account management. Global financial conglomerates are particularly 
prone to operations of a cross-border nature, which undermine capital account 
management. Furthermore, the unhedged foreign currency exposures of non-financial 
corporations need to be monitored by the financial intermediaries, and the regulators need 
to be cognizant of this in view of the possible impact of the exchange rate on the portfolios 
of financial intermediaries. 
Finally, any set of measures involving the capital account would require discrimination 
based on residential status or on the currency of denomination in contracts, and often on 
the basis of both. The limitations on effective capital account management are set by a 
country’s legal framework and the space available for public policy at the national level, 
taking into account the relevant bilateral, regional or multilateral treaty obligations that the 
country has entered into. 
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Avoiding capital flight to developing countries: a counter-cyclical approach∗ 
Stephany Griffith-Jones and Kevin P. Gallagher 
Introduction 
Developing countries have in recent years again become the destination for speculative 
capital flows, with inflows reaching pre-crisis levels. Many of these nations are deploying 
prudential capital regulations to stem these inflows. Macroprudential regulatory measures in 
recipient countries could be coupled with action by advanced countries in order to 
discourage capital outflows and risk-taking from their economies, so as to encourage the 
productive use of capital within their own economies; such measures would also avoid 
excessive exchange rate strengthening in developing economies, both supporting their own 
growth and helping to avoid possible future crises within these developing economies. 
Indeed, one important aim of regulating cross-border capital flows in both recipient and 
source countries is the reduction of systemic risk build-up in both, thus reducing the risk 
of future crises. We argue therefore that such measures for managing excessive capital 
outflows from developed countries, especially from the US, could be a clear win-win, as 
they would benefit both the US and the developing economies. The only ones to lose 
would possibly be financial institutions, with regard to short-term profits; however, we 
have seen the disastrous results of defining economic policies solely to maximise profits 
for the financial industry, whilst neglecting their impact on systemic financial and 
macroeconomic stability and on the real economy. 
Capital flows in the wake of the crisis 
As nations across Asia and Latin America still have a long way to go in terms of income 
growth, foreign investment is welcomed by them. The problem is that the sheer volume 
and composition of these flows implies that a large part of them are short-term and volatile 
in character and do not go into productive investment. Furthermore, massive inflows of 
short-term capital have been causing asset bubbles and currency appreciation in 
developing countries, making macroeconomic policy difficult and increasing the risk of 
future crises; appreciation of exchange rates also discourages exports and import 
substitution by national production. 
Short-term capital inflows have been flocking to the developing world largely through 
carry trade and other mechanisms, usually using derivatives. Since the crisis began, 
interest rates have been very low in the US and other industrialised nations. There is clear 
evidence over the last thirty years that there is a broad correspondence between periods of 
accommodative monetary policy in advanced economies and capital flows to emerging 
market economies, as well as the reverse, with each monetary tightening producing capital 
flow reversals and often crises in emerging countries. 
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In the recent period, increased US liquidity and low interest rates have prompted US 
financial institutions to decrease their risk-taking in the US, thus leading to little or no 
creation of credit, which is the main transmission channel of monetary expansion to 
domestic economic activity. This has, however, increased risk-taking abroad, 
channelling it to nations with higher interest rates with an eye to rapid returns and better 
growth prospects in the medium term. Speculative short-term flows push up the value of 
emerging market currencies and create asset bubbles. It is for this reason that the US was 
criticised at the G20 meeting in Seoul in late 2010. For example, Brazil, with high 
interest rates, had seen an appreciation of over 40%, due in part to the carry trade, and 
was most vocal in Seoul. But this is a problem in many emerging and even low-income 
developing countries which, like Uganda, experience excessive short-term inflows 
during long periods. 
In contrast, emerging markets again experienced a “flight” to safety away from their 
economies from September to December 2011 when the Eurozone began to jitter − once 
again reversing much of the flows of the previous year and accentuating volatility. 
Prudential regulations in developing countries 
Emerging and developing economies have a “new” set of options which several are pursuing 
now to stem the tide. One of them is to engage in prudential capital account management by 
taxing, putting unremunerated reserve requirements, or discouraging excessive capital inflows 
by other means. Taken as a whole, these measures are not a panacea, but they do help to 
provide greater monetary policy autonomy to these countries; this is essential, since their 
growth rates are high, and it is essential for them to avoid not only inflation in goods and 
services, but also asset price bubbles and overvalued exchange rates. 
Many nations such as Brazil, China, Argentina, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, Peru, and 
Indonesia have put in place various forms of capital account regulations to limit excessive 
inflows. Such controls have been recently sanctioned by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) – a very significant shift. However, the support by the IMF for capital account 
regulations has some limitations. 
Indeed, capital account management measures follow a mountain of economic evidence 
gathered in academia and by the international financial institutions, most notably the 
National Bureau of Economic Research in the US, the IMF, the United Nations, and the 
Asian Development Bank, indicating that capital account management by developing 
countries is a useful tool of policy when accompanied by broadly prudent macro-economic 
policies. In February of 2010, IMF economists published a staff position note entitled 
“Capital inflows: the role of controls”, empirically showing that capital controls not only 
work but were “associated with avoiding some of the worst growth outcomes” (Ostry et al 
2010, 13) of the current economic crisis. The paper concludes that the “use of capital 
controls – in addition to both prudential and macroeconomic policy – is justified as part of 
the policy toolkit” (Ostry et al. 2010, 5). 
That IMF report singles out measures such as taxes on short-term debt (like Brazil’s) or 
requirements whereby inflows of short-term debt need to be accompanied by an 
unremunerated deposit to be placed in the central bank for a certain period of time (as 
practiced in the past by nations such as Chile, Colombia, and Thailand). The goal of these 
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measures – which are often turned on when capital flows start to overheat and turned off 
when such flows cool – is to prevent massive inflows of hot money that can appreciate the 
exchange rate and threaten the macroeconomic stability of a nation. 
The IMF’s findings came at an appropriate time. In the wake of the US Federal Reserve’s 
quantitative easing and other measures to loosen monetary policy, the carry trade had 
again started bringing speculative capital to developing countries, with the risk of 
disrupting their recovery from the crisis (even though, as mentioned before, there have 
been episodes in late 2011 of brief reversals of such flows). As José Antonio Ocampo 
(2011, 5) writes “monetary expansion may be largely ineffective in industrial countries but 
can generate large externalities on emerging markets”. 
To make the proper deployment of capital account management effective however, at least 
four obstacles need to be overcome. First, after a while investors tend to creatively evade 
prudential capital management through derivatives and other instruments. Second, US 
trade and investment agreements make capital controls difficult to implement. Third, 
speculative capital can still wreak havoc because hot money blazes past countries that 
successfully deploy controls to reach nations that do not. Fourth, the massive scale of 
capital flows from source countries may overwhelm relatively small countries even though 
they use capital account management of their inflows. 
Brazil started imposing a tax on hot money inflows back in 2009 and has been fine tuning 
it ever since, not only because of the volume of flows but also because the regulations 
were being evaded. Some investors have loop-holed controls by disguising short-term 
capital as foreign direct investment, or through currency swaps and other derivatives, or 
by purchasing American depositary receipts (ADRs). 
ADRs are issued by US banks and allow investors to buy shares of firms outside the US – 
enabling investors to purchase Brazilian shares in New York and thereby skirt controls in 
Brazil. In a step in the right direction, Brazil moved to put a 1.5% tax on ADRs to stem 
speculative circumvention of the controls. Thus, a Brazilian bank or investor that deposits 
shares with foreign banks will be charged the tax. Most recently (mid-2011), Brazil has 
started taxing net foreign exchange derivative positions above a certain level − an 
interesting measure, as it may help curb excessive pressure on the national currency to 
become too strong while helping to avoid evasion of other capital account management 
measures. It would be helpful for emerging economies to exchange their experiences 
regarding capital flow regulation and evasion of the controls and to analyse which 
measures have had better economic outcomes. 
Secondly, since 2003, US trade and investment treaties have made prudential management 
of capital accounts by developing country trading partners difficult if not impossible by 
mandating the free flow of capital to and from a country, regardless of that country’s level 
of development – for instance, in trade deals with Chile, Peru, and Singapore. (Singapore 
and Chile initially resisted these measures, but ultimately agreed to the treaties.) Pending deals 
with Colombia and South Korea would also ban prudential capital controls. Other higher-
income countries and trade partners – such as Canada and Japan – grant countries the right to 
use the macroeconomic tool, or at least grant exemptions to prevent or mitigate crises. 
The third problem is that capital will simply flow past nations that successfully deploy 
controls to nations that do not, implying negative externalities for the latter. Some 
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economists, such as former IMF economist Arvind Subramanian, propose full-fledged 
coordinated capital controls among all emerging market economies to circumvent the 
problem. This idea may have some merit, but of course not all emerging markets will 
agree to coordinate. We propose attacking the problem at its source, that is, in the 
countries where the flows originate. 
The fourth, and serious, problem is that if interest differentials are important, the incentive 
for investors to come into emerging economies is very strong, and the scale of capital 
account management required by the emerging country to resist them is very large; this is 
particularly the case because global capital markets are so large and so mobile, and can 
thus overwhelm the financial markets of relatively small emerging and developing 
economies. Again complementary measures in the source countries would help tackle the 
issue. Although the measures proposed below are aimed primarily at the US, which is 
currently the main source of carry trade, such measures would be even more effective if 
coordinated with other advanced countries that are sources of short-term capital outflows 
or risk-taking. 
Regulate the carry trade in the United States 
As pointed out, actions taken by developing and emerging economies regarding their 
capital accounts may not be enough to stem the massive wall of money coming towards 
them at times. Therefore it may be desirable to complement these measures with actions 
by the countries where the capital is coming from, especially the US. Given that most of 
the carry trade effect in the near future will come from the US, US authorities could start 
regulating the outflow of capital due to the carry trade. As pointed out, though the scale 
may be greater now, there have been several previous episodes where very loose US 
monetary policy contributed to surges in capital flows to developing economies, episodes 
that mostly ended in tears. As far back as 1998 D’Arista and Griffith-Jones (2008) argued 
for measures such as unremunerated reserve requirements to discourage excessively large 
portfolio outflows from source countries. 
At present, the US could introduce measures to discourage excessive carry trade flows 
from that country to the rest of the world, and especially the developing countries. This 
could be done, for example, by taxing such flows on the spot market; furthermore, foreign 
exchange derivatives that mimic spot transactions could have higher margin requirements 
to discourage them. Alternatively, such foreign exchange derivatives could also be taxed 
at a level equivalent to the tax on foreign exchange spot transactions, on the notional value 
of that derivative, such as non-deliverable forwards. Interesting lessons could be drawn, 
for example, from the recent experience of Brazil in taxing foreign exchange derivatives, 
which also seems to show the feasibility of such taxes. There are two routes through 
which US monetary easing is transmitted abroad: (a) the money and credit supply channel, 
which implies higher capital outflows and less credit creation in the US and (b) the 
derivatives channel, whereby the fixed risk budget of US banks or hedge funds is allocated 
more towards risk-taking with emerging economies and less towards risk-taking in the US. 
The proposal sketched above would attempt to curb both routes when and if desirable, that 
is when both excessive capital and risk-taking go abroad. 
Such an approach would benefit the US economy, since the purpose of monetary easing is 
precisely to encourage increased lending and risk-taking in the US, and not for funds to be 
Financial stability in emerging markets: dealing with global liquidity Ulrich Volz (ed.) 
48 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
channelled abroad. It would benefit emerging countries, whose economies are being 
harmed by excessive short-term inflows that could cause future crises. It would thus be a 
big win-win situation for the world economy. 
The results of the US Congressional elections unfortunately make it difficult for the US 
government to pursue the first-best policy to keep its economy recovering: further fiscal 
expansion, for a time. As Keynes taught us, and as we have seen during numerous crises, 
private investment and consumption will not recover on their own (due both to over-
leveraging and lack of confidence) without the stimulus of aggregate demand, which only 
governments can give in these particular circumstances. Once a recovery is on track, fiscal 
policy needs to contract in order to avoid both overheating and excessive public debt. 
The Fed has already brought the short-term interest rate to zero, that is, Ben Bernanke, to 
his credit, has ventured into the emergency toolkit. The Fed chairman should be applauded 
for his willingness to think past convention. As one of the last policy-makers in developed 
countries with significant economic power, he is an important voice for expansionary 
economic policy. 
On its own, however, a looser US monetary policy seems not to be enough to restore the 
US economy to growth; supportive fiscal policy would be highly desirable, as would other 
measures to stimulate aggregate demand. Furthermore, easy monetary policy may 
contribute to a further overheating of asset prices and exchange rates in the emerging 
economies; this could not only complicate macroeconomic management for them now but 
also increase the risk of future crises. 
To ensure that looser monetary policy helps the US economy grow, institutional 
mechanisms and a broader framework need to be found in order to channel the additional 
liquidity created by the Fed as credit into the real economy. The key is to expand credit to 
small and medium-sized enterprises, starved for funds as they are at present, and to 
finance large investments in infrastructure, including those required to generate clean 
energy and energy conservation. Institutional innovations may be necessary to achieve 
this, such as the creation of an Infrastructure Fund, possibly with the addition of special 
institutions dedicated to lending to small and medium enterprises. Indeed, in the US, the 
Federal Reserve could, for example, possibly use some of the liquidity it creates to 
purchase bonds of a US Infrastructure Fund or Bank; this would both provide credit to a 
key sector for future development and lead to an increase in aggregate investment and 
demand. 
Internationally, if the US were to dig into the emergency toolbox again, it could impose 
prudent capital regulations or taxation on the outflow of speculative capital from the US 
via mechanisms such as the carry trade. As discussed above, this might help to avoid 
future crises which would harm not only the emerging countries but also the US and the 
world economy. Taxation may have some important advantages. Firstly, taxes are more 
difficult to avoid or evade, since they involve not merely authorities like the Federal 
Reserve but also the Internal Revenue Service, whose enforcement mechanisms are 
possibly stronger.23 Secondly, such taxation could generate some additional revenue for a 
US Government with a large budget deficit, surely an attractive feature. However, the tax 
                                                
23 We thank Nelson Barbosa for this point relating to the Brazilian experience. 
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would need some ex-ante flexibility on rates so that it could be modified according to the 
level of outflows and derivative positions. Complementary to introducing measures like 
new taxes to discourage outflows of capital or increased risk-taking abroad, it seems 
clearly desirable – in the US and elsewhere – to reduce existing tax biases (i.e. tax 
loopholes) which favour such flows; indeed, this could be a first step to discourage 
excessive short-term outflows. 
Measures to discourage short-term outflows would make it easier to keep the liquidity 
created by the Fed within the US and improve the chances of going toward productive 
investment. 
Road to the G20 
Re-orienting capital flows for productive development and resulting growth should be a key 
priority as world leaders prepare for the next G20 meetings. Prudential capital account 
regulations, deployed in both the industrialised and developing worlds, should be examined 
as one instrument to achieve this aim. Coordination between developed and developing 
countries on this issue would be desirable; an advantage here is the fact that the aims of both 
developed and developing countries often coincide. However, it does not seem desirable for 
such coordination to be imposed multilaterally, since no institution at present seems to have 
the governance needed to be trusted as appropriately representing the collective interests of 
all countries. Nevertheless, the IMF could continue to be a useful forum for exchanging 
experiences of capital account management (by both developed and developing countries) 
and possibly providing a useful, voluntary forum for informal coordination − at least in 
cases where all countries involved desire such a role to be played. 
To rectify some of the problems related to capital flows, industrialised nations (especially 
the US) should consider regulating the carry trade and providing safeguards in their trade 
treaties in order to allow developing nations to deploy prudential regulation. Developing 
countries should also impose prudential regulations. The Financial Stability Board, or 
another relevant body, as well as national regulatory authorities, should play a watchdog 
role regarding those who evade these regulations. 
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What role for the FSB? 
Jo Marie Griesgraber 
The appearance of large quantities of global liquidity coincided with the end of the 
Bretton Woods agreement in the 1970s, when Eurodollars, money without a country, 
were free to seek the highest returns. This phenomenon could only expand when 
computers enabled currencies to move with the speed of light, and the ideology of 
neoliberalism ordained that this was the best desirable goal. Secrecy jurisdictions in the 
Caribbean, New York and London ensured that all this could happen without the 
nuisance of taxes.24 The financial crisis beginning in 2007 was not the first financial 
disaster created in the so-called “advanced economies” to swamp the developing world, 
but it is the current and continuing disaster that peoples and governments of the world 
have yet to master (Rodrik 2011). 
In this context, developing countries are instructed to develop sophisticated regulations 
and competencies for dealing with the onslaught of financial flows – whether into the 
country or out of the country. They are also warned that they must stay abreast of 
rapidly changing financial innovations. 
How do developing countries, especially the poorest, train and retain skilled financial 
professionals when their first priorities are food, clean water and sanitation, primary and 
secondary education, preventive and restorative health care, roads, electricity, and 
communication? Why must scarce resources be diverted to gaining an understanding of 
complex financial instruments instead of meeting basic human needs? The hard answer 
to these questions is “They must”, because the situation will be worse unless floods of 
liquidity are managed in order to slow them down and thereby reduce the loss of jobs, 
livelihoods, and resources. 
What options are available for developing countries to deal with global financial flows? 
The best options – capital controls, regulations in the sending countries, and the 
transparency of banking, taxes, corporate profits and losses – could be realised in the 
medium term. Campaigners throughout Europe, the US, and parts of the global South are 
insisting on an automatic exchange of information between countries on all earning and 
taxes; the disclosure of the beneficial owners of all corporations, trusts, foundations 
registered in any secrecy jurisdiction (e.g., London, Switzerland, Delaware, the Cayman 
Islands); ending transfer mispricing and the practice of hiding gains in low tax 
jurisdictions and posting losses in high tax jurisdictions; and reversing trade agreements 
that require host countries to offer all benefits and present no barriers to foreign 
financial services. 
The immediate options for Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs) 
involve national level regulations, transparency, and coordination as presented in 
Financial Stability Issues in Emerging Market and Developing Economies, a recent 
paper submitted to the G20 Finance Ministers by the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) (hereafter, the FSB 
                                                
24 See Chwieroth (2010) and Shaxson (2011). 
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paper).25 The paper identifies financial issues and makes corresponding recommend-
dations regarding EMDEs, notably recommendations relating to the regulation and 
surveillance of banks and non-bank financial institutions (both large and small), 
management of exchange rates, and increased reliance on domestic currency loans. 
Regarding banks, the FSB paper reflects the influence of Louis Kasekende and Victor 
Murinde – the former was one of the paper’s authors – on the need for low-income and 
other developing countries to exercise caution in incorporating recommendations of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision aimed at reining in the largest banks in 
advanced economies.26 EMDE domestic banks have frequently rushed to implement the 
Basel agreements, resulting in unnecessary domestic credit restrictions. They raised 
reserve requirements to levels in excess of their needs, thereby limiting the resources 
available to lend to the local economy and leaving them capable only of lending to the 
national government. 
International banks with branches and/or subsidiaries in EMDEs are charged to share 
information on the financial well-being of the overall institutions and include host 
country managers in oversight committees and any international supervisory colleges. 
Non-bank financial institutions within the EMDEs tend to be small in absolute size but 
significant within the local economy. These include micro-financial institutions, 
cooperatives, and mutual funds. Micro-finance is highlighted for its overall lack of 
regulations. With investments coming from outside the country, often in hard currency, 
the cost of loans becomes subject to international currency rates, and repayment must 
also be in values equivalent to hard currency. Large foreign banks, attracted by the high 
interest rates and the high rates of repayments, are among the investors in micro-finance. 
The FSB paper encourages local regulators to have domestic banks and non-bank 
financial institutions use domestic currency in their operations, thereby enabling greater 
local control over interest rates and reducing unexpected cross border flows and 
currency exchange fluctuations. 
It acknowledges that exchange rate policies are one tool over which EMDE governments 
have some control, hence the recommendation to increase the use of local currency by 
local banks and non-bank financial institutions alike. Another tool for expanding 
reliance on and increasing the legitimacy of domestic currency is the expansion of 
domestic capital markets. If capital is available from local sources, the difficulties of 
repaying international debts are reduced. Domestic capital is also expected to involve 
longer-term investments in the real economy. In contrast, a flood of hard currency into 
                                                
25 See FSB, IMF and World Bank (2011). The authors included some experts from emerging markets 
and developing economies; this was appropriate given that the latter were the objects of study and 
recommendations. The G20 summit in Pittsburgh established the FSB, bringing together national and 
international regulators to promote systemic financial stability. The G20 group drives the FSB agenda; 
in turn the FSB reports to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bankers. The Chair designates 
working groups to develop consensus recommendations and present them to the Plenary. In its 
biennial meetings, the Plenary accepts working group reports by consensus, with implementation 
depending on national action. Final reports and full membership of the FSB are available on its 
website (www.fsb.org). The small secretariat works from the Bank for International Settlements 
offices in Basel, Switzerland. 
26 See Kasekende, Bagyenda and Brownbridge (2011) and Murinde and Mlambo (2011). 
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or out of a country can cause wild gyrations in the exchange, inflation and interest rates. 
Too much inflow of hard currency results in inflation and currency appreciation, 
harming the export economy. When interest rates are raised to reduce inflation, they 
reduce access to domestic credit and long-term investments in the real economy. Such 
volatility motivates middle and upper class individuals to hold their wealth outside the 
country, where it is less likely to lose its value. In short, when a wave of foreign 
currency moves out, it can carry with it more funds than it originally carried in. The FSB 
paper asks finance source countries to take steps to lessen the outflow. 
The FSB paper further recommends floating bonds in local currency instead of 
international currency. It also suggests the use of derivatives as protection against 
currency rate volatility. In such instances, the EMDEs would again be using some of the 
instruments that were central to the present financial crisis. With caution, these could be 
useful. 
Despite the merits of many of its recommendations, the FSB paper fails to address the 
basic vulnerability of EMDEs to the volatile global financial non-system. The 
recommendations are like tinker toys holding back a tsunami, unable to withstand the 
storms when foreign markets for exports dry up, domestic capital flees, and commodity 
prices sky-rocket or collapse as the EMDEs become more or less useful places for the 
wealthy to park their capital. 
The FSB paper does give a nod in the direction of other issues which may be relevant to 
the EMDEs, but are addressed “in other G20/FSB workstreams [such as] the 
management of sizeable and volatile capital flows; the design of policy measures to 
address the risks arising from systemically important financial institutions; the 
development of macro-prudential policy frameworks; the creation of effective resolution 
tools and regimes for financial institutions; strengthening the oversight and regulation 
of the shadow banking system; and reforming the functioning of over-the-counter 
derivatives and commodities markets” (FSB / IMF / World Bank 2011, 3). The FSB 
paper does encourage, in the case of resolutions or bankruptcies of financial institutions 
in the home country, the sharing of information with host countries and their 
participation in resolution committees. Strangely when recommending the use of over-
the-counter derivatives to expand and strengthen the use of local currencies, the FSB 
paper remains silent regarding their regulation. Regrettably, none of these other 
workstream papers benefit from the inclusion of non-G20 voices and perspectives. 
EMDEs clearly have a strong stake on the global stage in the stability of the global 
finance system, but they also have scant opportunity to participate in the design of that 
system’s management and re-regulation. The era of the closed, self-sufficient state as an 
option has ended. It is essential that EMDEs invest their best brains in participating in 
the FSB, the Standard Setting Bodies (SSBs), and the IMF in order to ensure that 
informed, respected voices articulate the likely impact of any proposed regulation on 
countries and peoples least able to sustain the harm from financial crises. 
Acting on the decision of the G20 in Toronto, the FSB recently created six regional 
consultative groups: the Americas, Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
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Europe, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.27 Each is co-chaired by a G20 
member and a non-G20 member, and is comprised of a “reasonable” number of 
additional non-G20 countries to keep the size manageable, plus the private sector. The 
G20 Co-Chair will present the findings to the biannual meetings of the full membership 
of the FSB; the non-G20 Co-Chair will be present at the plenary as an observer. The 
FSB website describes the meetings’ initial agendas in broad categories and identifies 
countries which participate but not individuals. Clearly, the quality of these regional 
consultative groups is of the essence (Lombardi 2011). 
The 13 SSBs that also participate in the FSB generally await reform.28 Some have 
become more inclusive, expanding their membership to include the full 24 member 
states of the FSB. All require much more transparency. And none has yet incorporated 
principles of accountability. 
Even with these reforms, the poorest EMDEs are usually absent from the room, and 
hence, for all practical purposes, do not exist when decisions are made that will shape 
the future of financial markets. This need not be the result of malice – it is simply that 
those not in the room do not have a voice and can and do suffer from negative 
“externalities”. 
All these useful recommendations emanating from the FSB have yet to be implemented 
on national levels. Further, they must be accompanied by the more fundamental changes 
of generalised use of capital controls and financial transaction taxes to slow the flow of 
global finance and put it at the service of the real economy.29 Above all, financial 
transactions must be exposed to the cleansing sunlight of transparency that can reduce 
the torrents of illicit financial flows and open up secrecy jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
27 The FSB Charter stipulates that the FSB “will consult widely amongst its Members and with other 
stakeholders including private sector and non-member authorities. The consultation process will 
include regional outreach activities to broaden the circle of countries engaged in the work to promote 
international financial stability” (FSB 2009, Article 3).  
28 According to the FSB website, the Standard Setting Bodies (SSBs) include the FSB itself, the IMF 
and the World Bank, as well as the more usually recognized bodies: the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the Committee on the Global Financial System, the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, the International 
Association of Deposit Insurers, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the 
International Accounting Standards Board, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, 
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. 
29 See Stiglitz et al. (2006). 
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International capital flows and institutional investors∗ 
Bernd Braasch 
Introduction 
The financial crisis has clearly revealed that we need a deeper knowledge of the 
underlying reasons for capital flows, their volatility, their rapidly changing compositions, 
and in particular, the main drivers of capital flow. In this respect there is a broad 
consensus among policy makers from advanced, emerging market economies (EMEs) and 
developing countries alike. But how to achieve this is another matter owing to lack of 
transparency, the increasing importance of shadow banking, and a lack of timely and 
internationally comparable data. This chapter highlights the potential benefits of extended 
global monitoring of international capital flows and calls for more thorough analysis of the 
role and behaviour of institutional investors.  
Portfolio strategies and capital flow volatility 
Increases in capital flow volatility have been driven by the same factors which have 
fuelled the ongoing process of financial globalisation, namely the institutionalisation of 
savings, the marketisation of finance, the process of creating new financial instruments, 
and the accompanying, increasing shift of financial risks to private households and firms. 
This development has been enhanced by financial liberalisation and deregulation, as has 
been described in myriad articles. Thus the influences of the so-called push and pull 
factors as determinants of the volume and direction of international capital flows are also 
well-known. 
But relatively little attention has been paid to the real drivers of capital flows: those 
institutions and investors that are moving markets with their cross-border investment 
decisions and rebalancing activities. When looking for underlying reasons and stable 
relationships between financial variables across borders, we have to monitor the main 
actors and their strategies. To use the term “drivers” for interest rate differentials, spread 
levels, growth differences etc. is in my view misleading. True, they may indeed build the 
financial environment or, to continue this metaphor, the car, but its speed and direction is 
determined by those who use the car, namely the international investors. Their portfolio 
strategies and rebalancing activities can explain significant aspects of capital flow 
volatility, contagion, spillovers and the vulnerabilities of macroeconomically sound 
countries. 
A deeper and ongoing monitoring of the behaviour of institutional investors as one pillar 
in the monitoring of global capital flows can deliver significant progress. The portfolio 
strategies of institutional investors and globally active banks build an important hinge 
between the financial and the real sphere of the economy. Two points should be 
highlighted in this context. Firstly, there is no doubt that portfolio decisions are 
increasingly influencing fundamental variables and prices, which in turn are major driving 
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forces for the whole economy of a country. But secondly, their decisions are not always 
guided by fundamentals. The efficiency of portfolio strategies does not always correspond 
with the needs of fundamental or macroeconomic efficiency. 
Benefits of enhanced global monitoring 
The main objective of monitoring global capital flows more closely is to enhance global 
and national financial stability. Such global monitoring should focus on all aspects that 
contribute to a better assessment of the stability of the financial system as a whole. This 
includes a better understanding of how the main global players and drivers of international 
capital flows behave and how that behaviour changes the structures of financial markets. 
This would help policymakers design better responses to external shocks and changing 
international crisis transmission channels (Braasch 2010). This applies not only to the 
main objective – prevention of a new financial crisis of the dimension of the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis – but also with regard to improving the process of information gathering 
and analysis in order to make progress towards more effective regulation on a global and 
regional level. 
The current financial crisis has underlined the importance of global monitoring, among 
other things, because ongoing financial globalisation has enhanced the influence of global 
financial factors for national financial markets. For example, the variance of EME spreads 
is increasingly influenced by global factors such as global liquidity and institutional 
investors’ risk appetite. Some empirical studies have drawn the conclusion that up to 50% 
of spread variance in selected EMEs is influenced by these global factors (González 
Rozada / Yeyati 2006). 
This development not only casts light on the stronger dynamics of contagion but also on 
spillover effects into the real economy. This produces another argument in favour of 
enhanced global monitoring: the transmission of shocks from the financial sector into the 
real sphere of the economy has become much broader and more complex. It is no 
overstatement to say that the strong, unexpected worldwide synchronicity of the sharp 
global decline in real activities after the Lehman shock was caused mainly by global 
financial factors and that the latter are of increasing importance for national and global 
business cycles. Global monitoring of international capital flows could therefore 
significantly deepen our knowledge of the dynamically changing interdependencies 
between the financial and the real sphere of the economy. This in turn would provide 
valuable information for improving the integration of changing financial structures, 
including prevalent assumptions about the behaviour of globally active banks and 
institutional investors, into macroeconomic models. 
A further lesson to be drawn from the financial crisis is that most financial (soundness) 
indicators and early warning systems failed to send reliable early warnings of the build-up 
of distortions or severe tensions in the financial system. Despite the fact that many 
financial institutions raised warnings or issued critical assessments of the sustainability of 
sector-specific developments, there were hardly any reliable indications of the dynamics 
of potential contagion, the possible channels through which shocks could be transmitted, 
and the weakness of complex financial structures. Global monitoring of international 
flows could facilitate or support the required restructuring of early warning systems. A 
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better knowledge of investor strategies and rebalancing activities would complement or 
support these efforts and enhance the effectiveness of early warning indicators. 
Moreover, improved global monitoring could also support various vulnerability exercises. 
The financial crisis has shown very clearly that even EMEs which have sound 
macroeconomic conditions and have been successful in strengthening their regulatory 
framework were nevertheless heavily affected by at least the first wave of the crisis. 
Global financial factors, in particular the strategic behaviour of globally active banks and 
institutional investors, can contribute significantly to explaining the vulnerabilities of 
EMEs under the changed financial environment. The increasing importance of this 
argument is underlined by a recent empirical study by Turner (2009), which has drawn the 
conclusion that although macroeconomic stability is without a doubt an important factor, 
macroeconomic factors during the global financial crisis were of no significance with 
regard to sudden stops or the outflow of liquidity. In other words, macroeconomic factors 
hardly made a difference. Other empirical studies, such as Didier, Love and Martinez 
Peria (2010), concur that the main channel of transmission during the global crisis was 
financial. Even when all the hurdles and restrictions of empirical studies are 
acknowledged, the challenge is clear. An improved system of monitoring would deepen 
our knowledge of the implications of a deeper integration of EME financial markets into 
the world economy (CGFS 2009). 
In addition, an improved global monitoring system would be instrumental for improving 
regulatory frameworks. Greater transparency of international capital flows is a necessary 
pre-condition for creating the most effective regulatory framework, targeted regulation, 
and the best kind of regulatory measures. Last but not least, global monitoring could help 
shorten the time lag between recognising a build-up of financial distortions, the emergence 
of a financial crisis, and data needs. 
“Optimal” assignment of roles 
We must also evaluate an appropriate assignment of roles in monitoring capital flows and 
global liquidity on a global, regional and national level. This is all the more necessary 
against the background of the changing institutional environment, with recently created 
institutions such as the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) or the ASEAN+3 
Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), each of which issues its own assessments of 
financial stability. 
The main criterion for clarifying the assignment of roles is the question of which 
institution has a comparative advantage. On a global level, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) has a clear comparative advantage, in particular with regard to the monitoring 
of financial structures, financial innovations, changing global transmission channels, 
response patterns, and the vulnerabilities of countries. Considering the primacy of crisis 
prevention, an improvement in surveillance, monitoring and deepened analysis are not 
only significant elements of a New Financial Architecture but should also be the most 
relevant elements of the IMF mandate in the longer term. It is important to have an 
institution which focuses on the ongoing monitoring of changes in the financial 
transmission channel. Monitoring might also have hidden potential for gaining better 
insights into the most relevant changes in the financial transmission channel and 
shortening the time lag between the first financial shock and targeted measures to contain 
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contagion and spillover effects. I share the growing view among economists that we will 
never have a perfect model and all necessary prospective information needed to make 
accurate assessments; nevertheless, the disparity between models and reality has currently 
become too great. 
The IMF should closely cooperate with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
using its extensive database and knowledge of global banking activities. It is important to 
ensure an independent assessment, analysis and formulation of policy implications; this 
might be primarily discussed and translated into action by the Financial Stability Board. 
The IMF should also seek to intensify or build cooperation with regional bodies such as 
the ESRB and the EU Commission in Europe, or AMRO in East Asia, to benefit from the 
comparative advantages of regional institutions such as better knowledge of the respective 
region or greater proximity to national regulatory authorities in the region (cf. McKay / 
Volz / Wölfinger 2011). 
Capital flow management – G20 recommendations, experiences and further challenges 
The G20 countries discussed the challenge of Capital Flow Management (CFM) under the 
French G20 Presidency in 2011 (cf. G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 
2011). The significance of drawing “coherent conclusions from country experience” 
should not be underestimated, since enhancing financial stability in the ongoing process of 
financial globalisation is a long-term challenge. This is particularly true with regard to the 
growth of global capital flows and its implications for financial stability. 
At its core, the capital flow problem is not pre-dominantly a cyclical phenomenon or a 
reflex response to the financial crisis and current conditions of excess global liquidity. 
Institutional investors themselves emphasise that it would be an oversimplification to 
blame accommodative monetary policies in advanced economies. Furthermore, they 
acknowledge that the problems of capital flow volatility will not be overcome with a more 
normal monetary stance in the US, Japan or on the part of European central banks. 
To a considerable extent, strong and volatile capital flows are a long-term, structural 
challenge and are part and parcel of the “New Normal”, a situation characterised by 
globally acting investors and an increasing weight of EMEs in the world economy. The 
dimension of this New Normal was reinforced by a recent study of the Bank of England 
which forecasts that by 2050 more than 40% of all external assets will be held by the 
BRIC countries, up from a current 10% (Speller / Thwaites / Wright 2011, 3). 
From the perspective of a central bank, the main objectives of capital flow management 
should be to enhance national and global financial stability, provide protection on the 
fringes of monetary policy, strengthen the robustness of the financial system, and secure a 
free flow of capital. Therefore it is worth emphasising that the G20’s “coherent 
conclusions” also imply that macroeconomic stability should be the first line of defence, 
since macroeconomic stability has proven to be the most effective way of dampening 
capital flow volatility. A further set of measures should focus on enhancing the stability 
and shock absorptive capabilities of financial systems by means of macroprudential 
measures. And as a more medium,o-long-term strategy, countries should develop and 
deepen their domestic financial markets, in particular bond markets. I fully agree with 
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colleagues at the Bank of England that the problem of “missing markets” is one of the 
most important challenges ahead (cf. Bush / Farrant / Wright 2011). 
According to the “coherent conclusions”, capital controls should be only temporary, 
transparent, and targeted to dampen risks which might endanger financial stability. Capital 
flow management measures should not delay necessary macroeconomic adjustment or try 
to keep exchange rates at unsustainable levels. Germany’s experience with controls on 
capital transactions in the 1960s and 1970s showed that these measures were unsuccessful 
in stabilising exchange rates and safeguarding a primarily domestically oriented economic 
policy against external influences. An ongoing convergence of approaches among 
different countries could further help to dampen capital flow volatility. 
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Global liquidity and the Brazilian economy∗ 
Renato Baumann 
Since the early 1980s, a liberalisation of financial markets world-wide has led to a process 
that is commonly referred to as financial globalisation. More flexible rules were applied to 
new financial agents, and new types of financial instruments were created, allowing the 
emergence of large globally operating investment banks and the development of a shadow 
financial sector, with financial firms that were not subject to the strict norms which were 
traditionally mandatory for commercial banks. Moreover, international liquidity has 
boomed since the beginning of the 1980s. The figures are quite impressive (cf. Palma 
2011): between 1980 and 2007 the stock of global financial assets increased ninefold in 
real terms, reaching USD 241 trillion, or 4.4 times the world output. From 1997 to 2007 
the number of over-the-counter derivative contracts involving credit default swaps jumped 
170-fold, with the amounts involved reaching 11 times the value of global output. At the 
same time, between 1990 and 2007 the total number of hedge funds and funds of funds 
grew from 610 to nearly 10 thousand, with assets of nearly USD 2 trillion. 
Where have all these resources gone? In some countries – typically the East Asian 
economies – the increased availability of international resources was used to complement 
domestic savings in financing a high investment rate. Other countries, like several Latin 
American economies, have absorbed a good deal of these resources while keeping their 
investment rates relatively low, so that most of this additional liquidity was driven towards 
consumption. This made them vulnerable when external financing dried up, leading to a 
series of debt and currency crises in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. As the 
sovereign debt crisis that erupted in Europe in 2010 has shown, several (mostly Southern) 
European countries also used inflowing capital resources for debt-fuelled consumption or 
non-productive investment. 
The availability of a significant amount of fresh resources, coupled with increased degrees 
of freedom in financial innovation and the mushrooming of new financial agents, have led 
to a self-feeding process in which higher liquidity has fostered new businesses; the 
resulting higher income has motivated higher prices of stocks and assets, and this has 
stimulated yet other financial operations, in some cases mixing and disguising good and 
bad credits. This process was given the “green light” by credit risk rating agencies, hence 
being perceived as safe and sound, and involved additional agents, such as insurance 
companies, to cope with the risks of credit default. At the same time, several multilateral 
agencies recommended opening up capital accounts so that the countries could benefit 
from this huge new wave of opportunities. With hindsight, the scenario comprised all the 
required components for a huge financial bubble. 
Problems started to emerge when the business cycle in the major economies lost its 
dynamism and several agents started to experience difficulties in paying for their 
operations. Thus in 2007 a set of difficulties showed up in the housing sector in the US, 
but bigger surprises followed from the – until then unsuspected – degree of involvement 
of the banking sectors in other countries in these operations. A second, even more 
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worrying set of surprises followed when it became clear that the payment difficulties were 
not restricted to the private sector but also comprised the sovereign debt of a number of 
Western European countries. 2010 is seen, therefore, as the starting point of a second, 
more worrisome wave of the financial crisis. 
Whereas Latin American countries experienced huge capital outflows during the global 
financial crisis of 2008–09, international lending started to resume in 2010. As a response 
to the global financial crisis, unprecedented amounts of liquidity were created by the 
world’s major central banks. The surge in global liquidity led to large inflows of capital to 
emerging countries, including those in Latin America. These capital flows gave rise to 
harsh criticism, especially vis-à-vis the Federal Reserve, which was accused of using 
expansionary monetary policy to force a devaluation of the US dollar and threatening 
financial stability in emerging countries. 
However, the turbulences in Europe have also started to affect capital flows to Latin 
America, which according to recent World Bank data saw an estimated decline of 12.6% 
in overall net capital inflows in 2011 (World Bank 2012). Portfolio inflows fell by an 
estimated 60% in 2011. Foreign direct investment (FDI), which is less volatile than other 
financial flows and accounts for a large proportion of financial flows to Latin America, 
remained resilient30. But the 29% growth of net FDI inflows to the region in 2011 is still 
markedly lower than the 43% growth in 2010. 
The still unresolved situation in the euro area is likely to result in low output growth in the 
coming years, as well as less availability of resources worldwide. This raises the question 
of what could be the actual impact of this new situation for other regions, such as Latin 
America, which has experienced a significant inflow of resources (USD 1.6 trillion) in the 
period 1990–2010, according to Palma (2011). 
As far as the relation with the euro area is concerned, several Latin American economies 
have benefitted in recent years from the liquidity of the euro market, as well as from the 
inflow of direct investment of European origin. In broader terms, there have been 
significant gains stemming from the boom in commodities prices, as well as from the 
increase in exports to Asia, particularly China. 
This means that the present European problems might affect Latin America through (at 
least) three channels: a reduction of credit lines (which might affect export credit), a 
reduction of FDI flows, and fewer trade opportunities. The latter aspect is related not only 
to direct Latin American-European trade, which might suffer from fewer imports by 
European countries: a major concern is also the extent to which the overall fall in 
European imports might affect the dynamism of the Chinese economy, a major importer 
of Latin American products. The external equilibrium of several Latin American 
economies depends in great part directly on their export performance to China. 
Among the most obvious characteristics of the inflow of resources in the Brazilian 
economy in recent years is a boom in FDI, reaching USD 69 billion in 2011 (an increase 
of 32% over the previous year, corresponding to 2.7% of GDP) as well as the fact that 
most of this investment is directed to the service sector, whose share in total inflow of FDI 
                                                
30 Regional data have been largely influenced by Brazilian figures. 
Financial stability in emerging markets: dealing with global liquidity Ulrich Volz (ed.) 
62 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
went up from 28% in 2010 to 46% in 2011. This is the counterpart of a number of factors, 
among them the ample availability of international liquidity on the lookout for investable 
projects, the lack of better investment opportunities in OECD economies, and specific 
features of the Brazilian economy, namely the improvement in income of lower 
population strata as well as the perspective of business opportunities related to deep-sea 
oil production, the 2014 World Cup, and the 2016 Olympic games. 
An inflow of such magnitude, when directed to non-tradable sectors, often affects asset 
prices. As a matter of fact, the housing price index increased by 7.8% and 7.5% in 2010 
and 2011 respectively, whereas the national wholesale price index varied only by 5.9% 
and 6.5%. This took place parallel to a GDP increase of 7.5% in 2010 but only 2.9% in 
2011. This clearly indicates an asset bubble. 
Another effect of this massive inflow of resources is the overvaluation of the exchange 
rate: between 2007 and 2010 it is estimated that the Brazilian real accumulated an 
overvaluation of 18.5% against the US dollar and 16% against a basket of 13 other 
currencies, according to FUNCEX (2011). This has had a clear effect on the export sector, 
with export performance becoming increasingly dependent on agribusiness while the share 
of manufactures drops. This in turn led Brazilian authorities to relate the lack of export 
competitiveness to proactive exchange rate policies of other trade partners and to blame 
the monetary authorities of OECD economies (the US in particular) for their lax monetary 
policies. 
The central aspect of the crisis, namely fiscal/financial disequilibrium, has affected foreign 
portfolio investment. The net inflow of portfolio investment in Brazil came down from 
USD 63 billion in 2010 to USD 25 billion in 2011 (BCB 2012). And even though Brazil 
has adopted one of the highest interest rates in the world, foreign investment in 
government bonds was more than halved, from USD 30 billion to USD 11 billion over the 
same period. At the same time, profit remittances increased from USD 30 billion in 2010 
to USD 38 billion in 2011, as subsidiaries had to provide resources to their headquarters. 
In spite of these movements Brazil can count on a number of alternative policy 
instruments hardly found elsewhere. The Brazilian economy presents a quite different 
macroeconomic situation than that of economies in the euro area. Net public debt has gone 
down from 60% of GDP in the early 2000s to 40% in 2011, much less than the more than 
100% observed in several European countries. 
In the external sector, total debt accounts for 12% of GDP but is surpassed by total foreign 
currency reserves (14% of GDP). The current account deficit is thus only 2% of GDP, 
well within the “acceptable margin”. This is in principle a rather comfortable situation. 
Domestic credit has gone up from 22% of GDP in 2002 to 47% of GDP in 2011, with 
three relevant associated characteristics. First, most of this increase results from credit 
provided by public banks, an instrument that proved important in the 2008 crisis. Second, 
since the adjustments of the financial sector back in 1995, the Brazilian banking system 
has operated with more strict performance criteria than those required by the Basel 
Agreements, making it less vulnerable. Third, this movement is parallel to an 
improvement in income distribution and to the incorporation of low income strata into the 
consumption market. 
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These features mean that a good deal of the recent growth of the Brazilian economy is 
related to the dynamism of the domestic market. Yet some analysts are worried about the 
investment rate being too low at only 18% of GDP since this may lead fairly soon to a 
lack of productive capacity and hence inflationary pressure. 
At the same time, however, as already said, a good deal of the comfortable situation in the 
external accounts follows from the trade surpluses obtained in trade with China and with 
other countries in the region. In this environment, what are the policy margins for coping 
with an external liquidity crisis? 
Brazilian authorities have a number of alternatives at hand: First, in case of a draught on 
credit lines, a share of the country’s foreign currency reserves can be used to sustain 
export financing (very much as in 2008). Secondly, a lack of liquidity can also be dealt 
with by relaxing the compulsory deposit which banks must hold at the central bank 
(ranging from 20% over savings deposits to 42% on deposits on checking accounts). 
Thirdly, Brazil has attracted unprecedented amounts of FDI, and this provides foreign 
exchange inflows that might help to compensate for eventual outflows motivated by an 
external crisis. Fourthly, the low level of public debt provides room for fiscal 
manoeuvring by the Brazilian government in case of a crisis. Stimulus to domestic 
demand can and has been provided via tax reduction. Fifthly, as in 2008, public banks can 
be used in order to channel credit into the productive sector. And last but not least, a more 
expansionary monetary policy can be adopted by reducing the real interest rate, among 
other possibilities. 
The major concern relates to current Chinese demand for imports. A fall in Chinese 
demand for commodities would not only negatively affect international prices, but would 
actually impose a constraint on the Brazilian trade balance, given the relatively low 
competitiveness of manufactured exports. 
In the medium run, the margin for relying on consumption by the lowest income strata 
looks increasingly narrow, and some re-designing of the macro policy will be needed, with 
a much higher rate of investment. This will, of course, require a number of parallel 
initiatives, comprising adjustment of the fiscal structure, improvement of the 
infrastructure, and the supply of a better qualified labour force. 
In summary, the present crisis in the euro area is bound to have negative spillover effects 
in many other regions. Latin America as a whole is in a special situation in that this is a 
crisis generated elsewhere − one which finds the region with a much better system of 
macroeconomic administration than before, with improved conditions in terms of income 
distribution and a more stable banking sector. 
More specifically, the Brazilian economy can count on a number of policy instruments 
that have proved to be quite important in previous liquidity crises. The major concern 
refers to the trajectory of global trade: a significant slowdown of opportunities would find 
the Brazilian economy heavily dependent on commodities for its trade balance and with 
less ability to compete in other export sectors. 
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AMRO’s role in regional economic surveillance and promoting regional economic 
and financial stability∗ 
Akkharaphol Chabchitrchaidol 
Over the past few years, much debate has focused on the benefits of regional financial 
cooperation, given that a global financial architecture in which the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) plays a central institutionalised role already exists. In Asia, developments in 
this area have unfolded continuously since the 1997 Asian crisis, while recent events in 
Europe have forced those countries to rethink their levels of cooperation and coordination 
within the region. Each of these regional financial development processes has been aimed 
particularly at helping that region to better tackle economic and financial crises, both by 
individual countries and by the region as a whole. In East Asia, regional financial 
cooperation was most visible in the setting up of the financial support facility known as 
the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000. In 2010 it was expanded and transformed as the Chiang 
Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) into a multilateral arrangement among all 
ASEAN+3 member countries (as well as Hong Kong, SAR). 
Regional arrangements for dealing with global liquidity: putting the cart before the 
horse? 
José Antonio Ocampo (2010) has broken down the concept of financial cooperation into 
four basic components: macroeconomic policy dialogue, economic policy surveillance, 
liquidity support during crisis, and exchange rate coordination. While recent troubles in 
Europe have further dampened the already weak impetus for exchange rate coordination in 
the East Asia region, financial cooperation in East Asia has remained steadfast in pursuing 
and strengthening cooperation in the first three areas. This stems from an implicit 
understanding that the basis for building confidence to tackle crises is twofold: having the 
required funds available for financial support when needed, and having the right 
information and policy-making support in place to establish confidence. 
In the case of East Asia, finding funds for financial support during crises turned out to be 
the simplest component of financial cooperation. This ease was no doubt a result of the 
ample foreign currency reserve positions of most ASEAN+3 economies. As a result, the 
CMIM’s founders went ahead and put their money on the table, first through a series of 
bilateral swaps, followed by a multilateralisation agreement, all the while recognising that 
setting up an institutionalised framework for managing CMIM funds would be a 
challenging task that would require care, since it would determine how effective the 
CMIM remains over the longer term. To prevent this challenge from delaying such a 
setup, the CMIM was established in 2010 with a sole commitment: that of creating a 
“CMIM Surveillance Unit” with responsibility for monitoring, assessing, and reporting on 
the macroeconomic status and financial soundness of all CMIM parties and the possible 
occurrence of macroeconomic and financial problems. The surveillance unit would also be 
responsible for assisting in timely formulation of policy recommendations. Should the 
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CMIM be called upon for assistance, the unit would also be responsible for ensuring that 
lending covenants were met. 
The CMIM members recognised early on the difficulty in establishing overnight a credible 
surveillance unit which could fulfil these functions. Since building a credible and 
workable institutional structure from scratch would take substantial time and resources, 
these functions were effectively “outsourced” to the world’s best-recognised provider of 
such duties, namely the IMF. Explicitly linking disbursement of even part of the CMIM’s 
resources to the IMF was a direct reflection of the CMIM’s lack of in-house mechanisms 
for ensuring that loans would be repaid. The link with the IMF, in lieu of the region’s own 
surveillance mechanisms, assured observers not only that the issue of moral hazard was 
being taken seriously, but also that the CMIM was a viable institution which could assure 
lenders that they would see their money again; it did so by ensuring that crisis-afflicted 
borrowing countries took proper, remedial policy actions to ensure the repayment of loans, 
much in the style of the IMF. 
Filling the gap in regional financial cooperation 
Behind the scenes, the CMIM members worked to set up what would eventually become 
the groundwork for the CMIM’s institutional framework in the form of the ASEAN+3 
Macroeconomic Research Office, or AMRO. In early 2009, the ASEAN+3 finance 
ministers announced at a Special Meeting in Phuket that the regional surveillance 
mechanism would need strengthening to be robust and credible enough to facilitate 
prompt activation of the CMIM, specifically through the establishment of an independent 
regional surveillance unit to promote objective economic monitoring. In their statement, 
the finance ministers also explicitly conditioned a delinking of more than the current 20% 
from the IMF until “[a]fter the above surveillance mechanism becomes fully effective in 
its function” (ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers 2009). 
The ultimate goal of AMRO, as mandated in the agreement for setting up the CMIM in 
March 2010, was to create a surveillance mechanism that would keep track of the 
economic and financial soundness of members, assist in making policy recommendations, 
and continue monitoring after CMIM funds were disbursed. In order to circumvent the 
administrative, bureaucratic, and legal hurdles of 14 economies which would be required 
to set up AMRO as an international organisation, AMRO was established in April 2011 
and registered in Singapore as a research office with the legal status of a Limited 
Company. Setting up this temporary incarnation while the hurdles toward transformation 
into an international organisation were being worked through would allow AMRO to 
begin functioning immediately. Its quick setup from scratch is a testimony to the 
ASEAN+3 members’ political determination to set up a working institutional framework 
as soon as possible. It also reflects the dynamism and political will to achieve tangible 
milestones in regional financial cooperation in times of urgency, rather than being mere 
symbolism and watered-down resolve, as some critics have noted. 
A unique role and place in regional surveillance 
Although linkage with the IMF is in place to ensure efficiency of disbursement, CMIM 
members have gone to great lengths to point out that AMRO does not aim to duplicate the 
surveillance functions of the IMF. AMRO is expected to leverage its regional advantages 
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and capabilities in macroeconomic surveillance and monitoring, particularly its ability to 
understand the idiosyncratic challenges facing countries in the region from a home-grown 
perspective. 
Two key features of AMRO’s regional surveillance are apparent. Firstly, AMRO plays a 
unique role in the ASEAN+3 surveillance mechanism through its participation in the 
ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue process. This process, with its closed-
door meetings, provides ASEAN+3 countries with a platform for peer review, dialogue, 
pressure, and cooperation. It allows a tightly-knit group of senior officials in the region to 
search for and find ways of addressing the most pressing economic and financial issues, 
both at the domestic and regional levels. Sharing experiences and enhancing the 
understanding of other members’ problems and their responses to various issues have been 
a basic part of these gatherings. 
Secondly, AMRO’s own setup, with a staff of professionals from the region, ensures 
greater understanding of the financial and fiscal constraints and prospects of the members. 
AMRO can draw upon the benefits of being both small and in touch with the region 
through its close contact with stakeholders and member authorities. This setup has placed 
AMRO in a unique position, with close and direct access to the top economic policy-
makers in the region. In the past, these high-level meetings culminated in a finance 
minister-level meeting which from 2012 onwards will be transformed into more 
encompassing meetings between the finance ministers and central bank governors. 
Beginning in 2011, AMRO has participated in these meetings as an advisor, consultant 
and stakeholder. The greater sense of ownership by members of AMRO in the region also 
helps to foster this special relationship between AMRO and the ASEAN+3 countries. 
It is worth noting that a special relationship does not necessarily translate into a “cosy” 
one. One of the most crucial aspects of AMRO’s surveillance is its independence from 
authorities. From the start, AMRO was established as an independent entity with no 
strings to any existing institution or any government office or ministry. AMRO’s core 
team members are full-time staff that are independently sourced and not seconded from 
member countries. While close collaboration with the IMF, Asian Development Bank, and 
other international financial institutions is welcome, AMRO’s surveillance is conducted 
independently of the surveillance work of other institutions. 
Achieving effective surveillance 
AMRO’s approach to regional surveillance is indeed different in many ways from the 
IMF’s approach. Keeping in mind that one of the means of effective surveillance is 
through collective pressure, AMRO’s approach is through peer pressure rather than public 
pressure. AMRO’s discussions with authorities of member countries are limited to 
confidential advisory services within the group, and do not consist in pointing out 
potential problems to the public at large. In the current context, not publishing reports and 
surveillance results can create benefits by permitting a more comprehensive exchange of 
views and perspectives between the AMRO team and the members’ economic 
policymakers and technocrats, thus preventing issues from becoming politicised. This 
makes authorities more likely to be open to comments and criticisms. Furthermore, non-
publication does not imply a lack of transparency among the members, and does not 
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preclude or prevent AMRO from performing straightforward and frank assessments within 
the confines of its own membership. 
Members need to be comfortable with the surveillance unit; the surveillance unit in turn 
needs to build trust and credibility and to engage with the authorities closely even in 
normal times. Being a small, tightly-knit group makes it possible for AMRO to focus 
surveillance on all members evenly at all times and to engage constructively with 
authorities on an on-going basis. In this way, AMRO hopes to build trust over time. This 
would be more difficult in larger institutions, where focused engagement with any 
particular country tends to develop only when that country is in crisis. 
Helping the region cope with macroeconomic challenges 
AMRO was established to facilitate analysis of economic and financial conditions both 
regionally and in individual economies. Its regional context and overview across the 
membership helps illuminate the effect of external shocks on both the region and its 
individual economies without obscuring variations in each country’s circumstances and 
experiences. 
As a regional institution, AMRO’s role is to take a region-wide view of risks and their 
implications. For example, in analysing shocks, it is necessary to understand how they 
affect our largest members, Japan and China (who together account for close to 80% of 
the region’s GDP), and also to understand how developments in these two economies 
affect other members. We need to recognise that these transmissions can be complex, 
given interlinkages through trade and production, as well as through the banking and 
financial channels within the region itself. 
Where possible, AMRO needs to provide policy recommendations for national policies as 
well as on how to take joint action on issues affecting the region as a whole. That is, 
AMRO’s mission is to recommend cooperative action where needed, either with or 
without calling upon the CMIM. In the latter case, AMRO needs to continue to build up 
its capacities and to establish credibility for its own lending conditionality, independent of 
IMF programmes, in order to assist in crisis resolution. 
It is worth noting that both the members and the public in general should have realistic 
expectations of what AMRO can achieve within a reasonable period of time. Discussions 
over the past year have reflected high expectations for AMRO, not only in its core 
function of conducting effective regional economic surveillance, but also in becoming a 
strong, permanent CMIM secretariat that might eventually manage liquidity support to 
member economies in times of turmoil. More ambitious plans are being discussed for 
creating new instruments and increasing the pool of funds, all of which would remain 
reliant on AMRO’s analyses, recommendations, and even management. The risk, then, is 
of stretching AMRO’s resources too thinly before its capacity is ready. 
Going forward: AMRO and regional financial cooperation 
One important lesson that East Asia may have learned through the gradual process of 
ever-tighter financial cooperation since the 1997 Asian crisis – a lesson reaffirmed in the 
recent Euro-area crisis – is that financial cooperation, rather than coordination, is the way 
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forward. It may be unrealistic to discuss policy coordination until the basic surveillance 
mechanisms and a culture of peer review and constructive criticism are more widely 
accepted. Recent attempts in large international fora and their limited success in achieving 
transnational policy coordination – as a means of bringing about global rebalancing, for 
instance – further indicate that policy coordination is difficult to swallow for any country, 
given the heterogeneous nature of international institutions and members. 
In view of increasing uncertainty in the ASEAN+3 region in 2012, triggered among other 
things by debt problems in Europe and the US, the increasing volatility these problems 
bring to Asian markets, and the greater risk of shocks, timely and effective region-wide 
surveillance is becoming increasingly important as a means of gauging effects and 
remedies on individual economies. Given policy risks both within and beyond the control 
of members, or potential system-wide shocks such as currency wars, beggar-thy-
neighbour policies, or unforeseen tail events, cooperation will be crucial as we go forward 
to prevent us from ending up in lose-lose outcomes which may otherwise prevail. This 
will depend upon successfully building strong institutions for providing the groundwork 
for regional cooperation and managing and following through. Both by bringing such 
issues to the table and coordinating cooperative outcomes, AMRO is in a unique regional 
position to point out the risks and facilitate agreement on how to address such challenges. 
It can help prevent the region from reaching an uncoordinated but destabilising 
equilibrium where all parties are worse off. 
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